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 ABSTRACT 
 
The Application Of Insurance As A Risk Management Tool For Alternative Dispute 




In modern days, construction projects have become more and more complex and 
intriguing. One source of the complexity arises from the large number of parties 
involved. This is especially the case for large-scale construction projects. Because of such 
complexity, disputes are almost inevitable and implementation costs associated with 
dispute resolution have become increasingly expensive. Because most projects operate on 
tight budgets, cost effective dispute resolution plays an important role in the success of a 
construction project.  
For this purpose, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) techniques such as 
negotiation, mediation, and arbitration are being widely adopted in large-scale 
construction projects to resolve disputes in more effective and cost-saving ways. 
However, the risk of incurring dispute-related cost overruns always exists because of the 
uncertainty in the distribution of dispute occurrence and the effectiveness of 
contractually-predetermined ADR techniques. As a result, the traditional self-insured 
structure which simply retains all dispute resolution costs to the project through 
contingency fees is no longer considered economical.  
While many insurance policies cover the settlement of a dispute, such as 
professional liability insurance, no specific insurance policy is dedicated to cover the 
ADR implementation costs such as fees and expenses that are paid to the 
owner/contractor’s employees, lawyers, claims consultants, third party neutrals, and other 
experts involved in the resolution process. To fill the gap, this dissertation proposes an 
 insurance model to reduce the potential variations in the dispute resolution budget by 
pricing ADR techniques as an insurance product. It is designed to transfer the risk of 
dispute-related cost overruns from the project to a third-party insurance company.  
To achieve this goal, this dissertation focuses on three major tasks: 1) investigate 
the role of ADR implementation insurance in construction risk management, 2) construct 
a mathematical model to represent the risk attitudes of project participants using utility 
theory and derive the basic premium of ADR implementation insurance using insurance 
pricing theory, and 3) develops a comprehensive framework to determine the optimal 
insurance premium by considering two additional insurance limits - a Deductible Limit 
(DL) and a Maximum Payment Limit (MPL).  
The objective of this dissertation is to provide project participants with an 
advantageous insurance policy that minimizes their total expected subjective loss. The 
model can serve as a decision-making support system to help project participants 
determine whether an ADR implementation insurance policy is attractive for a certain 
project. To illustrate the benefits of the proposed model, numerical examples are 
provided for simulation purpose. The results show that ADR implementation insurance, 
although not a tool to eliminate dispute resolution costs, is a powerful alternative in risk 
management to transfer the financial implications of ADR implementation risk to a third 
party.   
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Chapter 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
"If your only tool is a hammer, then every problem will look like a nail. 
When it comes to the construction industry, the main dispute resolution 
tool remains a lawyer, and every disagreement will look like a lawsuit." 
                                                                                            – ENR (1999) 
 
"Those involved in construction have to cope with so much learning in 
their own discipline that they shun further involvement in subjects such as 
insurance and law which in themselves are so deeply and intensely 
complex. However, insurance and law are interwoven in the basic 
procedures used in the construction industry to undertake work, be it 
design or construction or supervision or operation or any combination of 
the foregoing." 
                                                                                         – Nael G. Bunni (2003) 
For as long as the construction industry has existed, clients have misunderstood its ability 
to deliver problem-free products (Ware 2001). The construction process has several 
interdependent limits, such as scope, schedule, quality, and cost of work. Moreover, it 
involves a large number of personnel who work for the independent interests of the 
owner, contractor, supplier, engineer, etc. Because of the various limits and interests, a 
construction project is characterized by its inherent nature to foster disagreement and its 




disputes are common and even inevitable in contemporary construction projects. For 
example, Cheung and Yiu (2006) demonstrated that the likelihood of construction 
disputes lies in the range of 0.997 to 1.000 for traditional design-build projects in Hong 
Kong.  
The term "claim" and "dispute" are sometimes used interchangeably in the 
construction industry. In this dissertation, the two are treated differently. Here, a claim is 
defined by the federal government (1980) as follows:  
"A written demand or written assertion by one of the contracting parties seeking, 
as a matter of right, the payment of money in sum certain, the adjustment or 
interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising under or related to a given 
contract."  
A claim simply conveys dissatisfaction from one party to another and demands 
the respondent to react to the claimant's dissatisfaction out of contractual duty (Levin 
1998). Not all claims lead to disputes. A dispute only occurs when a claim is rejected by 
the respondent (Ware 2001). For example, with a delay in construction progress, the 
owner's request for compensation may or may not constitute a dispute, depending on how 
the contractor reacts. If the contractor concedes that the delay is the result of impropriate 
construction methods, it is a claim. However, if the contractor insists that the owner 
caused the delay and refuses to compensate for the damage, it is a dispute.  
Once a dispute arises, it is in all parties' interests to resolve it in a timely manner. 
A delay in the resolution of a dispute could have a significant negative impact on the 
project, especially in a litigious consumer-led environment (Ware 2001). According to 




United States every year and this number is increasing at an average rate of 10% per year. 
Inefficient dispute resolution not only prevents productive use of project budget, but also 
lowers work productivity, slows the completion process, impacts the ability to perform 
under various related contracts, damages long term business relationships and tarnishes 
the involving parties' reputations (Cushman et al. 2001; Corgan et al. 2002). These 
intangible costs, though difficult to quantify, may be catastrophic for a project. 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) techniques recognize the need for timely 
and cost saving dispute resolution and have been widely practiced in the construction 
industry. This introductory chapter introduces the basic facts of ADR techniques. Later 
chapters will focus on addressing the risks incurred during the practice of ADR through 
insurance. 
INTRODUCTION TO MAJOR ADR PROCESSES  
Over the past two decades, the construction industry has been notorious for creating 
disputes (Richbell 2008) and well-known for its continuing efforts in developing more 
efficient methods of dispute resolution (ENR 2000; Hinchey and Schor 2002). A good 
example is the adoption of ADR techniques to overcome the expensive, ineffective, and 
often adversarial litigation progress. 
The term "Alternative Dispute Resolution" is fairly new and it was not until the 
1970s that ADR emerged as a distinct field of study in law (Ware 2001). Generally, ADR 
refers to a contractual means to resolve disputes without going into the classic courtroom 
setting (Kovach 2004). It encompasses all legally-permitted processes of dispute 




ADR work are the result of recent developments, the practice of ADR itself is extremely 
old. In fact, commercial arbitration agreements took place between ancient Phoenician 
and Greek traders from 1200-900 B.C. (Ware 2001). Civil arbitrations can also be traced 
back to ancient times. In the sixth century B.C., arbitrators appointed by the Athenian 
central government traveled through the countryside to settle disputes between cities 
(Barrett 2004). Additionally, the ancient civilizations of Assyria, Babylon, China, Egypt, 
India, and Persia suggested that, while the tendency to solve differences by fighting was 
rooted deeply in human nature, people also appreciated the benefits of deepened 
relationships and lasting harmony by settling disputes in more peaceful ways. This search 
for alternatives to violence gave birth to the precursors of ADR (Barrett 2004; Boulle 
2005). Table 1 summarizes some advantages of ADR (Treacy 1995; Levin 1998; Harmon 
2003; Richbell 2008). 
Table 1: The Advantages of ADR Practice 
Speed 
 No "docket"- a list of cases waiting for trial 
 Maximum allowable time for each ADR technique 
 Expedited process solely dependent on the eagerness of the 
parties to solve the dispute and the complexity of the case 
Economy 
 Time is money 




 Less adversarial atmosphere 
 Helps preserve positive working relationships 
Impartial neutrals 
 Knowledgeable expert in the subject matter of dispute 
 Each party has the right to select an individual as their 
mediator or arbitrator 




 Allows for flexibility in controlling the process by the parties  
Privacy 
 Not open to public scrutiny 
 Hearings and awards are kept private and confidential 
Finality 
 The settlement could be final, binding, and legally 
enforceable, or advisory only, depending on the 
predetermined agreement 
Modern forms of ADR include negotiation, conciliation, mediation, arbitration, 
etc. (Barrett 2004). A few of the more common methods currently used in the 
construction industry are highlighted below: 
 Negotiation: according to Webster's Third New International Dictionary (2002), 
to negotiate is to "communicate or confer with another to arrive at the settlement 
of some matter". Negotiation is the most basic form of ADR (Ware 2001). 
 Dispute Review Board: a panel of three neutral experts who consider all facts of a 
dispute and conduct an informal hearing to make recommendations as a basis for 
further negotiations (Matyas et al. 1996). 
 Mediation: “a forum in which an impartial person, the mediator, facilitates 
communication between parties to promote reconciliation, settlement, or 
understanding among them” (Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §154.023). 
In construction dispute resolution, the mediator is selected by all parties and is 
commonly someone knowledgeable in construction and experienced in 
construction law. The mediator's role is advisory. He or she offers suggestions, 
but resolution of the dispute rests with the parties themselves. The whole process 
usually has a time standard (Ware 2001).  
 Arbitration: “a forum in which each party and counsel for the party present the 




(Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §154.027). Similar to mediation, parties 
select the arbitrator who will hear each side of the controversy and render a final 
decision (Ware 2001). Unlike mediation, arbitration is usually binding
1
.  
TYPICAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH ADR IMPLEMENTATION  
In dispute resolution, typical ADR implementation costs may include fees and expenses 
paid to lawyers, accountants, claims consultants, and other experts, as well as salaries and 
associated overhead of in-house lawyers, company managers, and other employees who 
must assemble the facts, serve as witnesses, and otherwise process the dispute (Gebken II 
and Gibson 2006; Menassa 2007). Gebken II and Gibson (2006) further break the cost 
down for each ADR technique, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: ADR Implementation Cost Breakdown 
In the 47 projects collected by Gebken II and Gibson (2006), the overall dispute 
resolution cost was over $35 million, which equates to 15% of the settlement/award 
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 In some cases, it is prearranged that the settlement decision will only be advisory and the decision will be 




















ADR Implementation Cost Breakdown 
Outside Counsel Fees
In-house Counsel Fees
Consultant and Expert Witness
Fees





amounts, 6% of the original claims, and almost 2% of the entire contract amount. It is 
also important to note the significant impact of selecting different ADR methods on the 
cost of dispute resolution. Referring to the dispute resolution continuum in chapter 2 
(Figure 4), related costs and hostilities of dispute resolution efforts are assumed to 
escalate from the lower stage of negotiation to the upper stage of arbitration (Menassa 
2007). For example, each of the three members of the dispute review board is paid 
between $1,000 and $2,000 to cover expenses of attending meetings and hearing sessions 
(DRBF 2007); this is compared to $7,000 to $8,000 that paid to the arbitrators per day 
(Zucherman 2007a). Based on 44 projects, Gebken II and Gibson (2006) estimated that 
the average costs for project disputes that end in negotiation, mediation, or arbitration are 
$330,199, $1,212,433, and $1,167,182, respectively.  
This cost difference between different ADR methods is the result of the 
component costs (Zucherman 2007b). Zucherman (2007b) detailed representative 
activities that are involved in mediation, arbitration and litigation for a hypothetical two 
party ADR processes, as shown in Table 2 (Zucherman 2007b; Menassa 2007). 
Table 2: Mediation, Arbitration and Litigation of a Hypothetical $600,000 Claim by Owner 
against Architect- Cost Components 










Filing and case service fee 
 
Legal fees 
1.fact investigation & preparation of 
demand 
2. AAA (American Arbitration 
Association) administrative 
conference 
3. one preliminary hearing via 
telephone 
4. Discovery 
    - prepare document request 




1.Fact investigation and 
preparation of complaint 
2. Case management status 
conferences with judge 




    -prepare document 




    - prepare for 4 depositions 
    - attend depositions (take and 
defend) 
    - third-party documents discovery 
    - discovery problems 
5. Facilitate expert witness 
investigation, case preparation and 
report 
6.  Respond to adversary dispositive 
motion 
7.  Prepare statement of claim 
8.  Final hearings 
     - prepare for and attend 




2. outside copying of discovery 
documents 
3. faxing 
4.  express delivery 
5. local travel and parking 
 






Motion to vacate/defend against 
such motion 
documents 
    -prepare and respond to 
interrogatories and requests 
to admit 
    -prepare for 6 depositions 
    -attend depositions 
    -third-party document 
discovery 
    -prepare discovery motion 
5. defend against discovery 
motion 
6.  Facilitate expert witness 
investigation, case 
preparation and report 
7. Respond to adversary's 
dispositive motion 
8. Prepare pretrial brief 
9.  Prepare pretrial motion in 
time 
10. Bench trial 
    -prepare for & attend 
    -prepare post-trial 






Appeal to appellate 
Court 
Based on these activities, the average costs for each ADR implementation process 
and litigation was estimated as follows: Mediation - $10,140; Arbitration - $94,500 plus 
$5,000 to $7000 for submitting a motion to vacate and defend against such a motion; and 
Litigation - $120,300 plus $25,000 to $35,000 to appeal as per the right to appellate court 
(Zucherman 2007b).   
In addition to the “hard dollar” figures for ADR implementation, there are also 




"The inefficiencies, delays, and loss of quality that disputes cause to the 
construction process itself, the lost opportunity costs of diverting productive 
employees away from profit-making activities into litigation support, and the 
costs of fractured relationships between parties who would otherwise profit if they 
could continue to do business with each other" (NRC 2007). 
The above discussion demonstrates that both direct and indirect costs of ADR 
implementation could place a significant amount of huge pressure on an already 
financially stressed project. This severe financial burden, coupled with a high occurrence 
frequency of dispute, would increase great risk to the project. To deal with such risk, the 
risk management matrix (Myhr and Markham 2003) as shown in Figure 2 suggests that 
the traditional self-insured structure will not work. Instead, the previous discussion 
concludes that construction dispute resolution is a high expensed event with high 





Figure 2: The Risk Management Matrix 
THE HISTORY OF INSURANCE IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
As the second largest industry in the world in terms of assets, the insurance industry has 
long been in the vanguard of understanding and managing risks. As early as the 2nd and 
3rd millennium B.C., Chinese and Babylonian traders distributed their goods to several 
vessels to minimize risk (Trenerry 2009). The Code of Hammurabi, developed by 
Babylon's best-known King Hammurabi around 1750 B.C., is the earliest available record 
that offers rules to discharge loans to traders/sailing merchants if their goods were stolen 
or lost (Bunni 2003; Vaughan and Vaughan 2007; Trenerry 2009). The modern origins of 
insurance date back to the advent of marine insurance in the 15th century, which was the 
result of the expanding world trade on the sea (Palmer et al. 1996). At the time, insurance 
policies were written to insure against various risks, such as weather-related loss and 




universally accepted, life insurance was developed, which was followed by fire insurance 
after the Great Fire of London in 1666 (Palmer et al. 1996).  
Construction insurance, as a branch under accident insurance, did not evolve until 
the 1930s. However, it quickly thrived after the World War II when the world was 
focused on rebuilding, which was accompanied by the technology boom in new materials 
and methods of construction (Bunni 2003). Since then, the construction industry has been 
in desperate needs for construction insurance. Today, various forms of insurance are 
provided to deal with different risks associated with a construction project. Traditionally, 
construction insurance transacts by issuing a number of insurance policies for the benefit 
of each party involved in a particular project, normally from more than one insurance 
company (Bunni 2003). In fact, insurance is such an important element of the 
construction contract that over 10% of the text of the AIA General Conditions of the 
Contract for Construction is devoted to provide a better understanding of the consolidated 
principles of risk, responsibility, liability, and indemnity in this area (Bunni 2003, 
O'Leary 2003). 
To understand the insurance aspects and administration of construction contracts, 
project participants should be reasonably conversant with The AIA General Conditions, 
Document A201, which specifies basic contract requirements for insurance that must be 
carried by the owner and contractor in broad general terms under Article 11-Insurance 
and Bonds (AIA 2007). Specifically, 24 paragraphs cover the contractors’ risks, public 





"A201, 11.1 and 11.2: The owner and contractor are both required to 
carry liability insurance."  
"A201, 11.4: The owner is also required to carry property insurance." 
"A201, 11.4.1.2: If the owner decides not to purchase property insurance, 
the contractor is entitled to purchase it and charge it to the owner. " 
"A201, 11.3: The owner, optionally, may require the contractor to provide 
Project Management Protective Liability Insurance. This coverage is in 
lieu of the owner’s and contractor’s liability insurance and covers the 
architect's vicarious liability as well. This insurance will be paid for by 
the owner. " 
Before beginning a project, both the owner and contractor must provide evidence 
of required insurance, respectively. Certificates of the contractor’s insurance should be 
addressed to the owner (AIA 2007, A201, 11.1.3). Copies of the owner’s property 
insurance should be addressed to the contractor (AIA 2007, A201, 11.4.6). In addition to 
these basic policies, other insurance is also required to cover ordinary day-to-day practice 
and other special activities. It is common to have Supplementary Conditions written in 
the contract that specify the particular insurance coverage required for the project, 
interests to be insured, policy limits, perils to be insured, insurance contract term, and 
deductible amount (O'Leary 2003). For example, marine insurance may be required in 




Most construction insurance products currently on the market can be divided into 
two categories: property insurance and liability insurance (Bunni 2003). Figure 3 shows 
policies usually issued for each party in connection with construction and Table 3 
provides a detailed explanation of these two types of insurance (Bunni 2003). 
 
Figure 3: Typical Insurances on A Construction Project  
* If the contractor is found to be non-negligent in respect of damage or loss but instead the 
owner is found to be responsible and is held strictly liable, then insurance would only 
apply if the non-negligence element of the risk is specifically included in the cover 
(Wallace 1995; Bunni 2003). 
**Decennial insurance is generally transacted to cover the liability of those involved in 
construction for latent defects in the stability of the structure and for major defects in the 




1. Employer's Liability 
2. Public Liability 














1. Employer's Liability 
2. Public Liability for limites in 
excess of that stipulated in the 
contract or in respect of liability 
not indemnified by the Contractor 
3. Public Liability for Non-
negligence* 
Property Insurance 
4. Insurance for any part of the 
Works taken over or used or 
occupied prior to completion  
Decennial Insurance** 





1. Employer's Liability 
2. Public Liability 
3. Public Liability for Non-
negligence 
4. Professional Indemnity, if 
design work is carried out by 
Contractor 
Property Insurance 
5. Contractors All Risks 
Marine Insurance 
6. Marine Transport policy 
Other Transport Insurance 







Table 3: Property Insurance And Liability Insurance  
Property 
insurance 
Provide protection to the works 
and any material, equipment and 
machinery connected with it. 
Transacted through: 
 Contractors' All Risks Insurance 
Policy  
 Erection All Risks Insurance Policy 
Liability 
insurance 
Provide protection to the insured 
party against specific legal 
liabilities to which he may 
become exposed as a result of 
activities culminating in bodily 
injury and/or property damage. 
Transacted through: 
 Employers’ Liability: towards 
employees 
 Public Liability: towards third parties 
who are not partly to the insurance 
contract 
 Professional Indemnity Insurance: 
towards the design professional 
  
Because of tough market conditions, the insurance industry continues to offer 
competitive insurance products and innovative programs specifically for different 
situations. However, gaps in insurance coverage always exist. Bunni (2003) offered a list 
of possible gaps: 
 Gaps through uninsurable risks 
 Gaps because of a lack of cover, either in the insurance practice or through the 
wish of the insured 
 Gaps because of the use of a conventional method of providing insurance. 
The lack of dispute resolution associated with risk coverage falls into a third category 
"the use of the conventional method of providing insurance." The traditional “wait-and-
see” model of self-financing dispute resolution costs is structured like a self-insurance 
program: project participants normally set aside a certain amount of money, in most cases 
as part of the contingency fee, to deal with potential disputes. However, it is difficult to 
predict the frequency and severity of disputes at the beginning of a project; therefore, 




the amount of contingency fee. Numerous factors affect the occurrence of disputes. 
According to Peña-Mora et al. (2003), the possibility of dispute occurrence varies with 
the project characteristics. Specifically, there are 25 potential sources of dispute in 
construction projects, from organizational issues to external and internal issues. Thus, 
even with a well-organized and well-managed project, the contractual ADR may not 
always be the best method to resolve all types of disputes. In addition, disputes can 
escalate and there is always the chance of incurring an unexpected high ADR cost. To 
understand how ADR implantation insurance works, I draw an analogy from the health 
insurance industry. In health insurance, there is no guarantee that a person will not have a 
serious accident or illness during a certain period of time even he/she appears to be very 
healthy. Also, minor symptoms could lead to severe medical condition if not treated 
properly. Therefore, people choose to manage this risk by purchasing health insurance, 
thereby transferring the risk of incurring high medical expenses to the insurance company.  
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND FORMAT OF DISSERTATION 
The research has two objectives and the related questions investigated are as 
follows: 
 First objective: Determine the feasibility of an ADR implementation insurance 
policy. 
1) What is the role of insurance as a risk management tool in construction 
dispute resolution? 
2) How should one calculate gross premium for a loss exposure? 





4) What is the maximum premium that risk-averse project participants are 
willing to pay? 
 Second objective: Determine the optimal insurance premium for project 
participants.  
5) What is the distribution of ADR costs for a certain project? 
6) What is the total expected loss for project participants with and without 
insurance?  
7) What is the total expected subjective loss for project participants with and 
without insurance?  
8) What is the total expected loss for the insurance company? 
This dissertation follows a three-paper format. Each paper builds on the previous 
to establish an advanced model.  The first paper (Chapter 2) investigates the role of ADR 
implementation insurance in construction risk management and explores the possibility of 
pricing ADR techniques as an insurance product. By drawing on the analogy from 
commercial insurance products such as health insurance, it proposes a mathematical way 
to determine the basic premium of ADR implementation insurance using the pure 
premium method adopted from insurance pricing theory.  
The second paper (Chapter 3) builds on the first paper and develops a 
mathematical model that captures the risk attitudes of project participants using utility 
theory. This model incorporates uncertainties in potential ADR implementation costs 
using Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and Poisson Process simulation, which will allow one 
to calculate the insurance premium and compare the premium with project participants' 




determine whether an ADR implementation insurance policy is attractive for a certain 
project.  
Building on the model developed in the second paper, the third paper (Chapter 4) 
considers two additional insurance limits - a Deductible Limit (DL) and a Maximum 
Payment Limit (MPL) to screen out moral and morale hazards, which are the two most 
common risks that prevent effective use of insurance. As a result of these three papers, a 
comprehensive framework will be developed to determine the optimal premium for ADR 
implementation insurance. The main goal of this dissertation is to provide a mutually 
advantageous insurance policy and minimize project participants’ total expected 
subjective loss. 
Chapter 5 summarizes the contributions of the research to our current 
understanding of financial risk management in construction dispute resolution. Chapter 6 
discusses the limitations of the research and I suggest potential streams for future 
research. Finally, a reference section is provided for a bibliographic list of the 






APPLYING INSURANCE PRICING THEORY FOR PRICING ADR 
AS AN INSURANCE PRODUCT2 
 
ABSTRACT 
As litigation is recognized as a costly and time-consuming method to resolve disputes, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) techniques are being adopted in construction 
projects to help handle disputes in a more effective way. However, there are potential 
costs related to ADR implementation as it requires expenditures to cover the expenses 
incurred by the owner’s/contractor’s employees and third party neutrals. Normally those 
costs are determined during the project planning phase prior to the actual occurrence of 
disputes. In this study, the possibility of pricing ADR as an insurance product will be 
explored. It is similar to the concept of “premium” in insurance industry. The objective is 
to provide project participants with an economic advantage by investing a certain amount 
of premium in the beginning of the project in exchange for compensation from the 
insurance company in the uncertain event of an unknown ADR costs that may be incurred 
during the construction phase. Insurance pricing theory’s underwriting concepts is 
utilized to develop similar concepts in ADR pricing. A conceptual model is presented to 
perform the ratemaking process by drawing an analogy from health insurance. An 
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numerical example of a construction project is used to illustrate the mathematical 
calculations required to determine the premium of the proposed ADR techniques. 
INTRODUCTION 
The construction industry in the United States plays a powerful role in sustaining 
economic growth. It provides job opportunities for 7.6 million people, more than 5% of 
the total nonfarm workforce and makes a large contribution to the gross domestic product 
(GDP), totaling $1.2 trillion or 9% of GDP in 2006 (AGC 2008). The intricacy and 
magnitude of the construction work often result in complex contract documents, which 
furthermore lead to complex disputes (Harmon 2003). In the construction industry, 
disputes are almost inevitable in each and every project due to poorly prepared and/or 
executed contract documents, inadequate planning, financial issues, and communication 
problems, etc. (Harmon 2003). The increasingly costly and time consuming court 
proceedings (Treacy 1995) indicate a great need in the construction industry to find a 
more effective method to resolve disputes.  
          Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is a general term for a number of methods 
by which disputes are resolved privately other than through litigation in the public courts 
(Kovach 2004). A Dispute Resolution Ladder (DRL) was proposed by Findley (1997) 
where a broad spectrum of ADR techniques is organized in a stepped manner. The 
example showed in Figure 4 includes six steps from the lower stage of prevention, 
negotiation, to middle stage of standing neutral, non binding, and finally to the upper 





Figure 4: An example of Dispute Resolution Ladder (DRL) 
When disputes escalate from lower stage to upper stage, the expenses and 
hostility also increase (Peña Mora et al. 2003). Compared to the general dissatisfaction 
with litigation, the implementation of ADR has proven to be faster, more effective, less 
formalistic, cheaper and often less adversarial (Treacy 1995). Questionnaire results in a 
study by Chau (2007) show that the top two reasons for project participants in Hong 
Kong to experiment with mediation or adjudication in construction disputes are "time and 
cost savings and desirability to continue amicable business relationship."  
          As mentioned above, ADR techniques are used to overcome the ineffectiveness of 
litigation in providing a fast and amicable settlement of construction disputes. However, 
it is not without costs. Neither time nor money is infinite and the implementation of ADR 
requires a certain amount of each, from both the owner’s/contractor’s employee and third 
party neutrals (Menassa 2007). According to Gebken II and Gibson (2006), while 
engaging in litigation is often more costly, resolving a dispute in the construction industry 
is an expensive endeavor no matter which dispute resolution methodology is selected. 
Moreover, although ADR techniques are implemented when disputes arise during the 




spent on dispute resolution is usually undertaken during the project planning phase. Thus, 
people who make managerial decisions of investing in an ADR technique in exchange for 
the perceived savings in the project face the uncertainty of the exact amount of ADR cost 
in the future. Also, a contractually-agreed dispute resolution methodology may not be the 
best one once disputes have arisen (Harmon 2003). If this is the case, the project will 
incur an even higher cost to adapt new approaches in the dispute resolution process. 
Given that most construction projects operate on tight budgets, how to transfer this 
uncertainty of an unknown potential ADR cost to a third party is the question this paper 
will address. 
          In the insurance industry, the uncertainty about whether a particular loss will occur 
is referred to as a risk. To reduce their risks, businesses and individuals transfer the 
potential financial consequences of their loss exposure to an insurer by purchasing an 
insurance product (Myhr and Markham 2003). For example, people purchases health 
insurance to cover medical costs they might incur in the future.  The risk transfer process 
does not eliminate the possibility that a loss will occur, but it does reimburse the costs 
associated with that loss. In return for this transfer, an insurer receives a premium (Myhr 
and Markham 2003). In the construction industry, because of the uncertainty of the 
frequency and magnitude of disputes and the potential disruption they could cause to the 
project, it would be important to think about the possibility of pricing dispute resolution 
methods---ADR techniques as an insurance product and transferring the uncertain 
potential cost of ADR implementation to a third party by paying a certain amount of 






In applying the basic concepts of risk management and insurance pricing models to an 
ADR pricing model, this paper will focus on the following questions, while being 
mindful of the overriding objective of promoting ADR techniques in the most possible 
effective and cost saving manner. 
1. Why it is useful to consider pricing ADR techniques as an insurance product? 
2. How can ADR be priced as an insurance product? 
          An analogy between general insurance products and ADR techniques may prove to 
be an answer to the first question and an ADR pricing model based on the insurance 
pricing model will be proposed later. 
ADR CONSIDERED AS INSURANCE PRODUCT 
In risk management process in the insurance industry, insurance products have served as 
both risk control and risk financing techniques. The first function is designed to eliminate 
or reduce the likelihood or amount of loss (Myhr and Markman 2003). For example, as 
part of most health insurance plans, routine visits to a doctor’s office or periodic 
physicals provide ways to reduce the likelihood of getting sick. Similarly, keeping ADR 
experts on the project can help identify potential conflict items before the actual 
occurrence of disputes and thus provide opportunities for preventing these issues from 
becoming the basis of a future dispute (Gebken II and Gibson 2006). Moreover, even if 
disputes do occur, consultants and experts who have close association with the project 




process on the lower, less contentious and less costly stages of the dispute resolution 
ladder.  
          On the other hand, as a risk financing technique, an insurance product also 
provides a mean to pay for losses that do occur (Myhr and Markman 2003). Again, taking 
health insurance as an example, the insurance company will compensate customers for 
their medical expenses wholly or partially, in return for payment of a specified premium. 
In dispute resolution, typical ADR implementation cost may include fees and expenses 
paid to lawyers, accountants, claims consultants and other experts; salaries and associated 
overhead of in-house lawyers, company managers, and other employees who have to 
assemble the facts, serve as witnesses and otherwise process the dispute, etc. (Gebken II 
and Gibson 2006). If ADR techniques can be priced as insurance products, project 
participants could expect to substitute a certain expense–the premium–for a potential 
unknown ADR implementation cost.  
           In addition, we see the potential for cost savings by applying the insurance concept 
of In-Network/Out-of-Network Coverage to ADR implementation. Outside counsel fees 
account for over 62 percent of the entire transactional cost in dispute resolution and are 
larger than the next most costly subcategory by almost four times (Gebken II and Gibson 
2006). In health insurance, coverage and cost saving are greatest when an in-network 
medical care provider is chosen. In the same way, parties involved in construction 
disputes could seek outside counsel within a network pre-agreed with the insurance 




INSURABILITY OF ADR  
Not all risks are insurable by private insurers (Pritchett et al. 1996). A risk that is 
perfectly suited for insurance would meet six ideal requisites: it must have a large number 
of similar exposure units; the claims must derive from a fortuitous loss outside the control 
of the principal; the losses should be definite; it must have a determinable probability 
distribution; it must be catastrophe unlikely, and last, it must have economic feasibility 
(Pritchett et al. 1996).  
For the first requirement, according to law of large numbers (Tijms 2007), as a 
sample of observations is increased in size, the relative variation about the mean declines. 
Because insurance premium rates are based on predictions of the future which are 
expressed quantitatively as expected losses, expected losses must be calculable within a 
reasonable degree of accuracy (Pritchett et al. 1996). If there are significant numbers of 
projects to be insured which require similar dispute resolution processes, then the average 
number and cost of dispute occurrence can be more accurately predicted for the universe 
of upcoming projects by analyzing and modeling statistical data on similar projects and 
past experience, even though the number and cost of disputes on a single project are not 
susceptible to forecast. 
Regarding the second requirement, fortuitous means the risk assumed by an 
insurer must involve only the possibility, not the certainty, of loss to the insured; and that 
the insured will not cause the loss to occur nor dictate the amount of its cost (Pritchett et 
al. 1996). For ADR implementation, although potential disputes occurrence arise from 
many factors, project participants do have a great deal of influence on the occurrence and 




hazard, which the insurance company will seek means to manage and control.  However, 
this “non-fortuitous” aspect of ADR actually addresses another important potential 
function of insurance: to prevent potential losses. Similar to periodic physicals in health 
insurance, the availability of ADR insurance offers the opportunity for the insurer to 
provide value-added services, or require the use of protocols that are intended to improve 
project management and project communication processes, and therefore reduce the 
likelihood of a dispute occurring in the first place.  
The third requirement means loss must be definite in time, place, and amount 
(Pritchett et al. 1996). In a construction project, there will be detailed contract provisions 
regarding recordkeeping and resolution processes for construction disputes, and in a DRL 
there will be very specific time and cost limits for each step of the ladder.  
For the fifth requirements, loss exposure in dispute resolution (ADR 
implementation cost) might be significant, but rarely “catastrophic” in nature. 
Catastrophic in this context refers to an event that would affect many insureds at the same 
time. For example, hurricanes or earthquakes in homeowners insurance are considered as 
catastrophes because thousands of homes may be destroyed by a single event. However, 
an economic downturn might cause a lot of disputes in the construction industry. As 
Jennifer Hicks (2008) said in “A look ahead at 2009”: “The world faces extraordinary 
economic times and the global credit crisis has caused delays or the suspension of many 
projects”. Usually in cases of exposure to catastrophes insurance companies use 
reinsurance (“insurance for insurance companies”) to protect themselves against losses in 




As to the last requirement, for insurance to be economic feasible, in other word, to 
make the purchasing of insurance practical, the size of possible loss must be significant to 
the insured and the cost of insurance must be small compared with the potential loss 
(Pritchett et al. 1996).  The negative impact of disputes to construction projects has been 
discussed at the beginning of this paper; Moreover, because of the uncertainty of 
frequency and severity of dispute occurrence, the cost of insurance is generally small 
compared to the potential ADR implementation cost. The detail will be explained later. 
To sum up, ADR implementation cost, based on a reasonable fit to these six 
characteristics, generally meets the requisites for insurability. In another word, ADR 
could be insurable in the private market. 
INSURANCE PRICING THEORY 
The pricing methodology used in insurance industry depends significantly on the variable 
(product, person, organization and activity) to be priced and the statistical data available 
(Myhr and Markman 2003). However, the basic principles of pricing methods are 
common across many types of insurance. The process of determining what loss exposure 
will be insured, for what amount of insurance, at what price, and under what conditions is 
called underwriting (Myhr and Markman 2003). Underwriting is common in all forms of 
insurance (Merlis 2005). For example, medical insurers will charge higher premiums to 
old people who have a smoking habit; property insurers may offer reduced premiums for 
safety features such as smoke detectors.   
             In insurance pricing, ratemaking refers to the process by which an insurance 
company calculates the price it seeks to charge its customers for the insurance it provides 




fortuitous future loss and their associated expenses are unknown when the insurance 
prices are developed at the beginning of an insurance contract period (Myhr and 
Markman 2003). 
             ADR pricing, analogously to insurance pricing, should take into account of the 
amount needed to pay potential ADR costs, and expenses as well as the targeted profits 
by the insurance company (which, if achieved, compensates the capital invested by the 
insurer in support of the process and the risk of uncertain financial outcomes that is 
shouldered by the insurer). 
            There are three categories of ratemaking methods insurers commonly use for 
insurance products such as medical insurance or property/casualty insurance that we have 
been examining as analogies for ADR: pure premium methods; loss ratio methods; and 
judgment methods (Myhr and Markman 2003).  Pure premium methods are used to 
develop rates from past claims experience; loss ratio methods are used for modifying 
existing rates; judgment methods rely heavily on the experience and knowledge of an 
actuary (Myhr and Markman 2003). This paper will use a pure premium method to 
illustrate how one might calculate premium rates for an insurance-like approach to 
funding ADR in the construction industry. 
Pure premium methods calculate indicated insurance rates using estimates of 
future claims and expenses, typically based on an examination of historical claims and 
expense experience, and also include a profit loading factor (Myhr and Markman 2003). 
The following formula uses several terms of art (Myhr and Markman 2003): Exposure 
units are the persons or items of property that are insured for a specified period of time; 




claims; Expense loadings include the insurer’s acquisition and operating expenses plus 
premium tax and possibly loss adjustment expenses (i.e., the administrative costs of 
handling claims), as well as a provision for profit; Gross premium is the final premium 
indicated to be paid to the insurance company and equals to Pure premium plus Expense 
loading. 
In pure premium methods, 
        Gross Premium = Pure Premium / (1−Expense Loading Factor)          Eq. (2.1) 
Where, 
                Pure Premium = Loss Frequency × Loss Severity                          Eq. (2.2) 
and where loss frequency is the average number of claims per exposure unit, and loss 
severity is the average cost incurred per claim.  Because insurance is a mechanism of 
sharing, or averaging, financial risk across a population of insured, these concepts 
specifically do not imply that each insured has, or is expected to have, the same number 
of claims per year, or that all claims involve similar costs. 
AN ANALOGY BETWEEN HEALTH INSURANCE & ADR TECHNIQUES 
To explain more clearly how to apply this formula to calculate the premium of ADR 
techniques, the process of ratemaking in health insurance is used as an analogy in this 
paper. There are several parallels between health insurance and ADR. First, both deal 
with unique objects. In health insurance, the exposure unit is individual human beings 
while ADR deals with individual projects. The ratemaking process in health insurance 
considers each customer’s unique features such as age, gender and life style, etc. 
Similarly, the likelihood, nature and cost of disputes in construction projects is influenced 




methods. The types of disputes that may arise, in turn would affect the implementation of 
ADRs. Second, both health insurance and ADR reflect various methods for addressing 
the underlying issue. In health insurance, there are many choices to deal with sickness, 
such as taking medicine, visiting a doctor’s office, or visiting a hospital, and the related 
outcomes and medical cost may be different depending on which method the customer 
chooses. Similarly, in dispute resolution there are many combinations of ADR methods. 
Third, the results of health care, like ADR, are not guaranteed. In health insurance, 
despite the measurements taken and medical expense incurred, the insurer does not 
guarantee to completely cure the disease. Likewise, using ADR techniques does not 
guarantee a satisfied settlement of disputes. The implementation might escalate to 
litigation eventually.  
Basically, health insurance provides protection against the possibility of financial 
loss due to health care use (Fernandez 2005). The insurance company obtains information 
on an applicant’s current health status, medical history, and other indicators of potential 
future costs. Then it estimates the overall risk of healthcare expenses and develops a 
routine finance structure such as a monthly premium (Claxton 2008). In the ratemaking 
process, pure premium refers to the total amount of financial obligation due to injury and 
illness that the insured is expected to incur over a certain period (Chen 2004). The pure 
premium can be separated into two aspects: frequency and severity. Frequency is how 
often a loss occurs during a defined time period; Severity is the average amount of loss 
(Chen 2004). In a construction project, if considering the use of ADR as analogous to an 
insurance claim (as ADR costs both time and money), then loss frequency is analogous to 




In health insurance, loss frequency is related to each customer’s unique features such as 
age, gender, life style, etc., and can be estimated once the insurer knows those 
characteristics of the insured. In construction projects, the possibility of disputes 
occurring and ADR being applied varies with the project characteristics, and can be 
estimated by knowing those characteristics of a particular project (Peña-Mora et al. 2003). 
Table 4 illustrates twenty-five potential sources of disputes in construction projects 
(adopted from Peña-Mora et al. 2003): 
Table 4: Sources Of Conflict And Dispute 




Internal/ external organizational structure, delivery 
systems, inappropriate contract type, contract documents, 
contract terms, and law 
Process 
Performance, quality, tendering pressures, payment, 
delays, disruption, acceleration, administration, formal 
communication channels, information sharing, reports, and 
poor communication 
People 
Misunderstanding, unrealistic expectations, culture, 
language, communications, incompatible objectives, 




Change, variations, environmental concerns, social 
impacts, economics, political risks, weather, regulations, 
uncertainty, and unpredictability 
Internal Incomplete scope definition, errors in design, unforeseen 
site conditions, construction methods, and workmanship 
Based on past experience and statistical data, project participants should be able 
to identify and weight the possible indicators of dispute occurrence from the above 
categories. For example, an international design-build commercial building project may 
have higher likelihood of disputes arising from problems in communication channels (i.e., 
organizational-process) and changing political environment (i.e., uncertainty-external).  
In the model explained later, each identified source will be given a weight to show its 




In health insurance, loss severity, or the estimated medical cost is influenced by 
the kind of medical service the customer is likely to seek, such as visiting a doctor's 
office or hospital. Different medical services result in different costs. For example, 
average expense per outpatient visit and average expense per hospital stay are 
significantly different. Similarly, the estimated cost for ADR implementation is 
determined by the different combinations of ADR techniques (such as DRLs) the project 
participants decide to incorporate into the contract documents, the likelihood of the 
different techniques being used, and the effectiveness and cost of these techniques. For 
example, in an airport project, the project participants decide to implement a DRL which 
goes through an Architect/Engineer or Supervising Officer to mediation, then arbitration 
if the first two fail to provide a satisfactory settlement. Then the “loss severity” can be 
calculated as the product of the daily expense and the estimated days for dispute 
resolution. Normally there is a time limit before parties escalate the dispute to the next 
stage. Moreover, in health insurance, the medical service the customer first seeks might 
not guarantee to cure the disease. For example, patients infected with an influenza that 
cannot be cured in a clinic may later be hospitalized.  In dispute resolution, the first step 
of the contractual DRL might not achieve a satisfactory settlement. Thus, the ADR cost 
may escalate as the resolution process is brought to a higher stage. This further illustrates 
the merits of considering managing ADR techniques through an insurance product that 




INSURANCE PRICING MODEL 
The application of the insurance pure premium pricing model to ADR is illustrated in this 
section through two simplified examples. The figures used in the examples are totally 
hypothetical, significantly over-simplified and are only used for explanation. 
Assume that Mike wants to purchase private health insurance for himself. The 
insurer, based on Mike’s characteristics (40-year old, male, using tobacco regularly), 
estimates that he has a 10% chance of becoming severely ill during a policy period of one 
year. Based on past experience of similar people, the insurer estimates that the average 
healthcare expenses per illness will be $10,000. In this case, the estimated Loss 
Frequency (LF) for insureds similar to Mike is 10%; Loss Severity (LS) is $10,000. Thus 
according to Equation (2.2), the estimated Pure Premium (PP) is: $10,000 × 10%= 
$ 1,000. For our representative health insurance company, add an Expense Loading 
Factor (ELF) of 20% to cover the expenses and the target profits
3
. Then according to 
Equation (2.1), the indicated Gross Premium (GP) is: $ 1,000/ (1-0.20) =$ 1,000/0.80= 
$ 1250. Thus, $ 1250 is the premium the insurance company calculates to be an 
appropriate price for Mike to pay for his health insurance
4
. 
In ADR for construction projects, the ratemaking process could be similar. For 
example, a homebuilder is considering constructing three new houses in a local 
subdivision. Assume that we have identified four sources of conflicts and evaluated them 
using a 0~1 rating system as shown in Table 2.2 (adapted from Peña-Mora et al. 2003) to 
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weight the loss frequency based on the past experience of this builder, the past experience 
of other builders, and the project characteristics. Here, Loss Frequency refers to the 
probability of dispute occurrence P(c) during the project. (The use of a maximum value 
of 1.0 in Table 5 corresponds to the highest frequency dispute type occurs on average per 
contract period.) 
Table 5: Loss Frequency Rating System 
Very low Low Medium-Low Medium Medium-High High Very high 
≈0 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 ≈1 
Assume that the builder is considering including a DRL in the contract document. 
In this DRL, once the dispute occurs, it goes through Architect/Engineer or Supervising 
Officer (ADR1) to mediation (ADR2), then arbitration (ADR3) if the first two fail to 
provide a satisfactory settlement. Then the “loss severity” is the product of the daily 
expense and the estimated days for dispute resolution. More specifically, when the 
dispute resolution process starts, the dispute is first turned to Architect/Engineer or 
Supervising Officer. To cover this expense, assume for this illustrative calculation that 
the unit cost is $500 per day for this step. If the initial attempt fails to achieve the 
settlement within the maximum allowable time, the dispute escalates to the next level 
with mediation between the owner and contractor representative; assume the cost at this 
level also is at a unit cost of $500 per day. Additionally, if the dispute is not resolved at 
the previous levels, it is turned to the final step of arbitration. Assume for this illustration 
that the cost at this level is $1000 per day. The builder then evaluates the impact of each 
source of conflict based the estimated duration of each dispute resolution process. As the 
builder lists various sources of conflicts and relates the probability that they will occur 










Duration of dispute 
resolution process (days)  
Expected total cost 
of ADR 
implementation i(ci) ADR1 ADR2 ADR3 
Miscommunication High (0.9) 20 - - $10,000 
Performance/ 
Quality 
High (0.9) 20 20 - $20,000 
Management Med (0.5) 30 20 - $25,000 
Contract type Low (0.1) 30 20 20 $45,000 
From this analysis, the builder and the insurance company are able to get a sense 
about the level for the estimated premium. According to Equation (2.2), the estimated 
pure premium (PP) is: 
    ∑ (  )
 
   
  (  )                                              
                    
Add an Expense Loading Factor (ELF) of 20% (illustrative value, assumed for 
this example) to cover the expenses and the target profits of the insurance company, and 
then according to Equation (2.1), the Gross Premium (GP) should be: $44,000/(1− 0.20) 
=$44,000/0.80= $55,000. Thus, $55,000 is the indicated premium for the builder needed 
to pay the insurance company for his ADR implementation insurance. (As noted earlier, 
actual premiums in the marketplace may vary.) 
CONCLUSION 
The objective of this paper was to explore the possibility of transferring the potential cost 
of construction project ADR implementation to a third party.  It appears that there are 
both risk management and risk financing benefits potentially available to builders if such 




techniques similar to those used in pricing traditional insurance coverages such as health 
insurance, specifically pure premium methodologies. Given the relatively simple example, 
the model proposed in this paper is by no means an encompassing system for ADR 
pricing. While the approach illustrated in this paper is easy to understand and apply, it is 
likely that much more sophisticated pricing structures will be needed in practice to reflect 
the wide variations of construction projects, parties, disputes, and the dispute resolution 
processes.   
For future research, more data must be collected regarding construction projects, 
and dispute resolution, particular the frequency and cost of relevant events. Additional 
data will allow for analyses that are more detailed and relevant, while remaining practical. 
In addition, future research should attempt to perfect the model in a more systematical 
way. While this paper provided a framework of the pricing method, the details of how to 
use it directly in a construction project still need more work.  
To next generation of pricing model for ADR might contain four modules: 
Information, Modeling, Results and Decision. Information includes the input of exposure 
data such as project location, engineering characteristics, contract type, etc. and policy 
information such as coverage value, deductible, limits. Then all the information will go 
through the Modeling process producing the Results of indicated Gross Premium. Finally, 
the calculated Gross Premium enters a decision making module in which the participants 
may consider the marketplace conditions regarding actual premiums, the effects of any 
risk management programs on the dispute frequency or cost, and the other financing 
alternatives available to the participants.  If the marketplace allows for a fair profit, the 




transfer allows for a useful reduction of the builder’s risk and the marketplace allows for 
a reasonable premium level, the builder may also be interested in paying a premium to 





INSURANCE AS A RISK MANAGEMENT TOOL FOR ADR 
IMPLEMENTATION IN CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES5 
 
ABSTRACT 
Nowadays, along with the inherent intricacy and magnitude of large-scale construction 
projects come increasingly complex disputes. Because most projects operate on tight 
budgets, alternative dispute-resolution (ADR) techniques such as negotiation, mediation, 
and arbitration are being widely adopted in large-scale construction projects to help 
handle disputes in more effective and cost-saving ways. However, the risk of incurring 
uncertain ADR-implementation costs in the dispute-resolution process has become an 
important issue. The traditional self-insured approach of simply retaining all risks is no 
longer considered economical. One way to reduce the potential for variations in the 
dispute-resolution budget is to price ADR techniques as an insurance product, which 
allows project participants to transfer the risk of incurring unexpectedly high ADR 
implementation costs to the insurance company. Despite this advantage, many factors are 
preventing project participants from investing in ADR implementation insurance. This 
paper proposes a model on how to use ADR implementation insurance as a risk 
management tool for construction dispute resolution. It first investigates the possibility of 
using insurance for ADR-implementation and then uses subjective loss to represent the 
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risk-averse attitude of project participants and quantify the effect of ADR implementation 
costs in monetary terms. Event-tree analysis (ETA) is used to simulate different dispute-
resolution processes and determine the probability mass function of ADR implementation 
costs by drawing analogies from seismic risk insurance. These probabilities are employed 
to calculate the expected ADR implementation costs and to derive the insurance premium. 
Finally, the gross premium is compared to project participants’ subjective loss to help 
them determine whether purchasing ADR implementation insurance is necessary. At the 
end, a numerical example is presented to illustrate the application of the methodology. 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, because of the inherent intricacy and magnitude of large-scale 
construction projects, construction disputes are nearly inevitable and increasingly 
complex (Harmon 2003). Since court proceedings are extremely costly, time-consuming 
and generally considered ineffective in construction dispute resolution, most construction 
contracts now contain some provision for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), which 
is the most generally acceptable contractual means to resolve disputes without going into 
litigation (Kovach 2004). Common ADR methods include negotiation, Dispute Review 
Board (DRB), mediation and arbitration (Peña-Mora et al. 2003). Often, a Dispute 
Resolution Ladder (DRL) is proposed in the contract for ADR implementation where 
multiple ADR techniques are organized in a stepped manner (USACE 1989, Caltrans 
2000, Peña-Mora et al. 2003). When disputes escalate from a lower stage of prevention to 
an upper stage of arbitration or litigation, the expenses and antagonism also increase 
(Peña-Mora et al. 2003, Menassa and Peña-Mora 2007). Typical ADR implementation 




claims consultants, third party neutrals, and other experts associated with the resolution 
process (Gebken II and Gibson 2006, Menassa and Peña-Mora 2009).  
Although ADR is recognized as a more effective and less adversarial technique 
over litigation in construction dispute resolution (Treacy 1995), project participants face 
uncertainty about future ADR implementation costs, as the number of disputes and the 
amount of ADR implementation costs in each dispute will not be known until the actual 
occurrence of disputes during the construction phase. In the traditional “wait-and-see” 
model, in which the ADR implementation costs are self-financed from the project’s own 
fund, this uncertainty prevents efficient use of funds, as some amount need to be held in 
reserve as part of contingency to cover potential dispute occurrence during the 
construction phase (Touran 2003a), and thus results in project participants’ constant 
worry over what will happen in the future.  
Drawing an analogy from the insurance industry where businesses and individuals 
transfer potential financial consequences of their loss to an insurer by purchasing an 
insurance product (Myhr and Markham 2003), one approach to reduce the negative 
influence of uncertain ADR implementation costs would be to structure and price those 
costs as an insurance product; this transfers the risk of unexpected high ADR 
implementation costs from the project participants to the insurance company. In return, 
the insurance company receives a premium which covers the company’s underwriting 
expenses and targeted profit. Although the risk transfer process does not directly 
eliminate the possibility that a dispute will occur, it does reimburse any ADR 
implementation costs associated with that dispute. Moreover, compared to the uneven 




payout of premium helps maintain a stable cash flow and thus makes it easier to budget 
and plan for insurance expenditures, as shown in Figure 5 (Adopted from Song et al. 2009). 
 
 
GP:   Gross Premium 
P:      Periodical Premium  
C:     Total ADR Cost  
Ci:    ADR cost for the ith dispute 
Figure 5: Comparison Of Cash Flows Of ADR Cost In Two Models 
This paper proposes a methodology for the design of ADR implementation 
insurance. The purpose of this model is to provide a mutually advantageous insurance 
policy for both the insured and the insurer, thus providing project participants with an 
opportunity to invest a certain amount of premium in exchange for compensation from 
the insurance company in the event of unknown ADR implementation costs that may be 
incurred during the construction phase.  
The paper is organized as follows.  First, it investigates the possibility of using 
insurance for ADR implementation. Adopting utility theory from behavioral economics, 
subjective loss is used to represent the risk-averse attitude of project participants and to 
quantify the impact of ADR implementation costs in monetary terms. Next, a financial 




using Event Tree Analysis (ETA) (Hoshiya et al. 2004). Finally, a numerical example is 
presented to illustrate the application of the methodology.  
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Designing ADR implementation as an insurance product remains an uncharted area in 
both academia and industry. To understand the reason for this, it is important to have a 
basic idea of the pricing methodology used in the insurance industry to determine 
premium rates. There are three categories of ratemaking methods: pure premium method, 
loss ratio method and judgment method; among them, the most commonly used is the 
pure premium method, which develops rates from estimates of future claims and 
expenses based on an examination of historical claims and past expense experience 
(Myhr and Markman 2003). In simple terms, pure premium is the total expected loss for a 
specified period of time, and gross premium is the final premium paid to insurance 
company which equals pure premium plus an expense and profit loading (Myhr and 
Markman 2003). For example, assume for a specific project that the expected number of 
disputes is E(n), the frequency of dispute occurrence, and the expected average ADR cost 
per dispute is E(c), the expected severity of ADR implementation costs. According to 
previous work by Song et al. (2009), the gross premium for ADR insurance is 
                                     ( )     ( )   ( )                                 Eq. (3.1) 
Where E(c) is the pure premium or total expected ADR implementation costs, and α is an 
expense loading factor to cover the expenses and target profits of the insurance company.  
As long as α is greater than zero, then ADR insurance is meaningless to project 
participants on an expected value (EV) basis. In the EV theory, when a decision maker is 




the expected loss amount E[X] in order to be relieved from future loss (Bowers et al.. 
1997). However, the premium that an insurance company charges as a return for bearing 
risk [E(c)+ α] is almost always greater than the expected dispute resolution cost E(c) 
because of α. Thus, project participants might avoid investing in ADR implementation 
insurance and just hold the expectation that a project will be properly managed therefore 
it will not incur significant, unexpected ADR implementation costs. This decision-
making process using EV theory exists in most insurance situations; for example, auto 
insurance, in which uninsured drivers often claim that they do not expect to have any 
accidents (Myhr and Markman 2003). 
However, analogous to health insurance, in which individuals purchase policies to 
cover uncertain medical costs that they might incur in the future, decision makers do not 
necessarily follow the result that EV theory would predict. This is because most people 
are risk-averse to some degree; they are willing to pay a fixed insurance premium that is 
in excess of the mean expected value of ADR implementation costs in exchange for 
shedding some uncertainty about the future (Bowers et al. 1997). Some authors refer to 
this as an exchange of a certain loss (the premium) for an uncertain loss (Pritchett et al. 
1996). Thus, quantifying the risk-averse attitude of project participants is the key to 
providing a mutually advantageous ADR implementation insurance policy. 
UTILITY THEORY AND SUBJECTIVE LOSS FUNCTION  
Because EV does not capture a decision maker’s risk attitudes, utility theory was 
developed to infer the subjective value or utility of different choices, and thus provide 
insights into decision making in the face of uncertainty (Bell et al. 1988, Keeney et al. 




value or utility being attached to a certain wealth of amount w (Bowers et al. 1997). 
Subjective loss is defined as the negative value attached by project participants to the 
uncertain ADR implementation costs that they might incur based on their degree of 
aversion to the risk that they face.  Unlike the traditional definition of a utility function, a 
subjective loss function (SLF) is used in this research to indicate the negative utility, u(c) 
that is attached to a given loss amount of ADR cost c, resulting from implementation of 
the dispute resolution process.  
For example, consider the following scenarios: project participants can choose 
paying a premium of $1,500 for sure or bearing the risk of incurring $4,000 ADR 
implementation costs (with a probability of 0.3) or incurring nothing (with a probability 
of 0.7); in the other scenario, the option is between a certain premium of $1.5 million and 
a possible ADR implementation costs of $4 million (with a probability of 0.3). For 
project participants in the first scenario, purchasing insurance might not be favorable 
compared to simply bearing the risk of losing $4,000, as the expected ADR cost is only 
$1,200; however, for risk-averse project participants, if the negative prospect of incurring 
significant ADR implementation costs as high as $4 million is taken into consideration, 
then there is motivation to consider investing in ADR implementation insurance. In this 
case, project participants make decisions based not on the expected loss ($1.2 M) but on 
the subjective loss, which could be quantified by their subjective loss function, u(c). In 
this case, the subjective loss is 0.3 × u($4 million)  and u($4 million) ≥ $4 million for 





It is natural to assume that for risk-averse decision makers, u(c) is an increasing 
function, because “the more loss, the worse (more negative utility) it gets” (Bowers et al. 
1997). For example, while an ADR implementation cost of $4,000 might be of little 
concern to project participants, possible dispute resolution implementation costs of $4 
million are certainly worth considering. In addition, each additional equal increment of 
loss results in a larger increment of associated negative utility (Bowers et al. 1997). For 
example, a loss of $2 million should have more than twice as much negative utility as a 
loss of $1 million. This is the mirror image of the principle of decreasing marginal utility 
in economics (Bowers et al. 1997). In this paper, it is referred to as increasing marginal 
negative utility as shown in Figure 6 (Adopted from Song et al. 2010). 
Figure 6: Characteristics of Subjective Loss Function 
The two properties suggested by Figure 4 are u' (c) > 0 and u"(c) > 0, where u'(c) 
= du/dc measures the slope of the line at each point of the curve; u' (c) being positive 
suggests that u(c) is an increasing function. The second inequality indicates that u(c) is a 
strictly convex upward function. From the viewpoint of the project participants, the 
maximum acceptable gross premium GP for assuming ADR implementation costs C is 
determined as follows (Hoshiya et al. 2004): 








The left hand side of the equation represents the situation where the project has 
ADR implementation insurance; thus, project participants only need to pay the premium. 
The right hand side is the case without insurance, where project participants should bear 
all future losses. In the latter case, project participants view the undesirable financial 
outlay of possible uncertain ADR implementation costs subjectively with the function u, 
which quantifies their risk-averse attitude towards a future risk in monetary terms. In the 
former case, project participants could choose to carry insurance for certain.  
According to Jensen’s inequalities (Bowers et al. 1997), for a random variable X 
and function u(c) with a convex characteristic,  
                                   If u"(c) > 0, then E[u(X)] ≥  u[E(X)]; 
                                   If u"(c) < 0, then E[u(X)] ≤  u[E(X)]; 
According to Eq. (3.2), the maximum premium that risk-averse project 
participants should be willing to pay is 
                                                        GP = E[u(C)]  
Combining this Jensen’s inequalities  
                                                        E[u(C)] ≥  u[E(C)] 
Then, for a risk-averse project participant, an acceptable maximum premium is: 
                                                       GP ≥ u[E(C)] ≥ E(C) 
In other words, the participant is willing to pay an amount greater than the 
expected value of ADR implementation costs for insurance to get rid of the uncertainty. 
Project participants with SLF u(c) are risk averse if, and only if, u"(c) > 0 (Bowers et al. 




Figure 7: The relationship between GP and E[u(C)] 
A SUBJECTIVE LOSS FUNCTION FOR ADR IMPLEMENTATION COSTS 
Building the SLF of project participants is a way to change their qualitative preference 
from alternatives that have uncertain payoffs with a consistent numerical comparison 
(Bowers et al. 1997). The process could be complicated, because it is a matter of 
subjective judgment and depends on many factors such as conflicting attitudes toward 
risk among project participants, project type, and environment of financial market 
(Bowers et al. 1997). Even for the same project participants, different projects will have 
different subjective loss functions that require re-evaluation (Bowers et al. 1997). Usually, 
SLF is expressed by several elementary functions such as quadratic, exponential, and 
fractional power functions (Bowers et al. 1997). It can be obtained by conducting a 
financial survey with project participants to determine the negative utilities (in monetary 




ADR IMPLEMENTATION INSURANCE MODEL 
The ADR implementation insurance model is constructed to help project participants 
determine whether investing in ADR implementation insurance is beneficial for a certain 
project. It includes five key parts as shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Analytic Flow Of The ADR Insurance Model 
Each stage in Figure 6 will be evaluated on the basis of past experience, statistical 
data and the unique characteristics of a project. Specifically, ETA is applied to simulate 
scenarios of dispute resolution outcomes and to determine the probability mass function 
of expected ADR implementation costs (Hoshiya et al. 2004). Then, gross premium (as 
quoted from an insurance company) is calculated and compared with the maximum fixed 
cost derived from subjective loss to determine whether insurance is acceptable to project 
participants.   
Event Tree Analysis  
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is a graphical representation of a logic model that identifies 
and quantifies all possible outcomes resulting from an accidental initiating event 




used to identify all potential accident scenarios and sequences in a complex system. To 
determine the frequencies of outcomes, let P(y) denote the frequency of the initiating 
event; let P(xi) denote the probability of event xi. Once the Initiating event Y has occurred, 
according to conditional probability (Ang and Tang 2006), the probability of outcome X 
is: 
P (Outcome X| Initiating event Y) = P (x1∩ x2 ∩ x3… ∩ xn) 
       = P (x1) ×P (x2 | x1) × P (x3 | x1 ∩ x2) …×P (xn | x1 ∩ x2 ∩ …∩xn-1) 
Then the frequency of Outcome X is:  
P(x)=P(y) × P (x1) ×P (x2 | x1) × P (x3 | x1 ∩ x2) …×P (xn | x1 ∩ x2 ∩ …∩ xn-1) 
The frequencies of the other outcomes can be determined in a similar way. 
In seismic risk analysis, ETA is utilized to identify the sequential damage and 
their probabilities to a concerned structure (Hoshiya et al. 2004; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission 1975). In this paper, ETA is used to help identify scenarios of dispute 
resolution process and quantitatively determine the probability of corresponding ADR 
implementation cost, making it possible to calculate the total expected ADR 
implementation costs. It first sets up the event of dispute occurrence as a specified 
condition. Assume the contractual Dispute Resolution Ladder (DRL) has m stages on the 
ladder: ADR1, ADR2,…ADRm. For the jth stage, assume the effectiveness of ADRj is kj, 
and the average cost for ADRi is cj.  For example, k1= 0.5 means 50% of the disputes can 
be resolved in the first stage.  When a dispute occurs, it first goes to ADR1, the first stage 
of the contractual DRL. If dispute resolution does not come to a satisfied settlement by 






Figure 9: ETA of ADR Implementation Costs 
Total Expected ADR Implementation Costs 
Without loss of generality, the risk of incurring ADR implementation costs in any 
construction project can be mathematically represented as follows:  
1. By n, the total number of disputes occurring in the period [from the notice to 
proceed (t = 0) to the project completion (t = T)]; n = N1, N2,.., Nk with 
probability q1, q2,.., qk respectively, where N1 is the minimum possible number of 
disputes and N1 ≥ 0, while Nk is the maximum number of possible disputes. Since 
construction disputes occur randomly over time, the arrival of disputes can be 
approximated with a Poisson Process (Touran 2003b). Let t1 be the time of the 
first dispute occurrence and ti be the time elapsed between the (i−1)th and ith 
events, i > 1; { ti } is the sequence of interarrival times. In a Poisson process, t1, 
t2,… are independent and identically distributed with an exponential (λ) 
distribution, where λ is the rate of dispute occurrence. Although the Poisson 
Process shows very good memory-less properties, it does not necessarily fit 




over time. Thus, to simulate construction dispute occurrence, a non-homogenous 
Poisson Process is used where λ is a function of time t expressed as λ(t).   
2. By cj, the average amount of ADR implementation costs for each dispute 
resolution process, where j = 1, 2,…, m represents the jth stage on the contractual 
DRL. Then, for each dispute, its resolution process bears m possible outcomes: 
resolved at ADR1 and cost c1, resolved at ADR2 and cost c2, … , resolved at 
ADRm and cost cm, with probability p1,  p2, and pm, respectively, in which 
∑   
 
       . According to Figure 7, the following can be obtained:  
                          (    )(    ) (      )                                   Eq. (3.3) 
Assume that the cost on each stage is independent.  
3. For the ith dispute (i=1,2,…,n), define xij = 1 represents that the ith dispute is 
resolved on the jth stage; otherwise, xij = 0. Thus    ∑    
 
     represents the 
total number of disputes that are resolved in the jth stage and follows a 
multinomial distribution M(n, p1 p2,…, pm), with the expected value E(xj) = n×pj, 
where j = 1, 2,…, m. Specifically, when m = 2,  then xj follows binomial 
distribution B(n, p1 p2). E(xj) is the expected number of disputes that are resolved 
on the jth stage. 
4. Among all n disputes, a total of R different possible outcomes exists. For each 
outcome, there could be xj disputes resolved with ADRj. Consequently, the total 
ADR implementation cost throughout the time horizon for the rth outcome is 
   ∑     
 
     with a probability of    ∏   
   
     , given a total of n disputes. 
The number of outcome which bears the same total cost and probability is 
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Then the total expected ADR cost is: 
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        Eq. (3.4) 
Total Expected Subjective Loss of ADR Cost  
As mentioned earlier, a subjective loss function (SLF) is used to indicate the negative 
utility u(c) that project participants attach to a given loss amount of ADR implementation 
costs C resulting from dispute resolution. The total expected subjective loss could be 
expressed as follows: 
                                  ( ( ))  ∑      
  
    
                                                  Eq. (3.5) 
where      is the total subjective loss when the total number of disputes is n.  
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 Eq. (3.6) 
Comparison between Gross Premium and Total Expected Subjective Loss 
The last step of the model is to compare the gross premium and expected subjective loss 
and determine whether investing in ADR implementation insurance is favorable. 
According to Eq. (3.2), if      ( ( )) , then there exists the possibility for an 
insurance policy. 
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE 
Assume there is a highway bridge project in which project participants decide to include 
a three-step DRL in the contract for dispute resolution (m = 3). In this DRL, a dispute 
goes through the Architect/Engineer or Supervising Officer (ADR1) to mediation (ADR2) 
and then arbitration (ADR3). If the DRL fails to provide a satisfactory settlement, then 
dispute resolution will eventually escalate to litigation, which will be much more costly. 
Details are shown in Figure 10 (Adapted from Menassa et al. 2010). 
 








Figure 10: Project DRL 
The estimated duration of this project is T = 720 days from Notice To Proceed 
(assuming 30 days in each month, T = 24 months). Assuming that disputes occur 
according to a nonhomogenous Poisson process, and the rate of dispute occurrence is 
 ( ) {
                        
                 (     
                    (      
 
In this case, disputes occur more frequently in the middle phase and towards the 
end of the project, which is comparatively realistic because more and more problems 
would emerge as the project processes. 
To determine the total expected ADR implementation costs, ETA, is determined 









Figure 11: Project ETA Of ADR Cost 
The following SLF is then adopted: 
                                             ( )            (      )                   
which is calculated based on 96 samples taken from insurance purchasing owners in a 
financial survey (Hoshiya 2004). The reason for adopting this particular SLF is because: 
First, it bears the properties necessary to represent a risk-averse attitude, as we can easily 
obtain that   ( )              (      )      and   ( )          
   (      )     . Second, it is the closest function form which can be used to estimate 
our pilot data. Last but not the least, exponential function is one of the fundamental 
functions and is easy to comprehend and calculate.                                  
Table 7 and Figure 12 show one run of the simulation. It includes when a dispute 
incurs (t/day); on which stage of the DRL is it resolved (ADR1-Architect/Engineer; 
ADR2-mediation; ADR3-arbitration; and ADR4-eventually goes to litigation); and 





Table 7: Simulation Results For One Run 
No. t/day ADR ADR Implementation Costs (c)/MM$ Subjective Loss (u(c))/MM$ 
1 32 1 0.015 0.212 
2 34 4 0.805 11.429 
3 36 4 0.805 11.429 
4 40 1 0.015 0.212 
5 50 1 0.015 0.212 
6 81 4 0.805 11.429 
7 90 1 0.015 0.212 
8 108 4 0.805 11.429 
9 125 1 0.015 0.212 
10 132 2 0.0525 0.744 
… 
71 634 1 0.015 0.212 
72 646 1 0.015 0.212 
73 648 3 0.165 2.338 
74 654 1 0.015 0.212 
75 671 1 0.015 0.212 
76 692 2 0.0525 0.744 
77 706 3 0.165 2.338 
78 712 2 0.0525 0.744 
Total (MM$) 12.52 177.67 
 
 











































































































The results of 1000 simulation runs and a 25% expense loading for the gross 
premium are presented in Table 8.  




Implementation Costs E(C) 
(MM$) 
Expected Subjective 
Loss E(u(C)) (MM$) 
Gross Premium 
GP(MM$) 
75 7.96 112.90 9.95 
 
Then, according to Eq. (3.2), a maximum fixed-loss GP that satisfies the 
following equation should exist to make insurance attractive to a participant: 
                                                       ( )           
This means that project participants are willing to pay more than the expected loss 
to transfer the risk from themselves to the insurance company. For a GP of $9.95 million, 
insurance would be an attractive option for project participants. In other words, for this 
specific project, the insurance company can potentially charge an expense loading factor 
(ELF) of more than 25%. Therefore, the gross premium for the ADR implementation 
insurance is feasible and mutually advantageous to both the project participants and the 
insurance company. 
CONCLUSION 
Pricing ADR implementation insurance is a complex process that involves many factors. 
This paper investigates the application of utility theory in the decision-making process for 
project participants to invest in ADR implementation insurance. Subjective loss can 




possible explanation for the validity of third-party insurance in construction management. 
Using subjective loss makes an insurance policy possible for risk-averse project 
participants despite the fact that the gross premium is higher than the expected loss. 
Moreover, Event Tree Analysis can serve as an effective tool to find the probability for 
each step on the DRL and to obtain the expected loss. This ADR implementation 
insurance, although not a tool to eliminate the possibility of a dispute resolution cost, is a 
powerful alternative in risk management to transfer the financial risk to a third party. 
Future research should focus on the following aspects. First, sensitivity analysis 
should be conducted on critical parameters such as the effectiveness of ADRi (ki), the 
average ADR implementation costs for each DRL stage (ci) , and the assumption of 
possible disputes (distribution parameters). Second, the time value of money should be 
applied to the model to make it more realistic. Third, the deductible should be included in 
the insurance policy to prevent moral hazard. In this case, the maximum gross premium 
that project participants would accept is determined in a different way, as they will carry 
part of the future loss too. Finally, there will be close work with the industry on how to 






DETERMINING THE OPTIMAL PREMIUM FOR ADR 




In most of today’s construction projects, disputes are almost inevitable, and the 
implementation costs associated with dispute resolution are becoming increasingly 
expensive. One approach to deal with the risk of dispute-related cost overruns is by 
pooling the risk using Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) implementation insurance. 
This innovative insurance product is designed to allow the insurance company to 
compensate any ADR implementation cost that project participants incur during the 
construction phase. In return, the insurance company will receive a premium for bearing 
the risk of excessive ADR implementation costs. Similar to commercial medical and auto 
insurance, the ADR insurance policy specifies a Deductible Limit (DL) and a Maximum 
Payment Limit (MPL) on project participants to prevent both moral and morale hazards. 
In this case, project participants must bear part of the future ADR implementation costs 
before their insurance is activated. Based on the basic framework of ADR 
implementation insurance previously developed by the writers, this paper proposes an 
advanced model with the two additional insurance limits to help determine the optimal 
point on the project participants’ subjective loss curve. The objective is to provide a 
mutually advantageous insurance policy and minimize project participants’ total expected 
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subjective loss. An example is provided to illustrate the benefits of the proposed 
methodology. The results show that project participants’ Subjective Loss Function (SLF), 
DL, MPL, and the Expense Loading Factor α together play important roles in 
determining the optimal premium for the ADR implementation insurance. 
INTRODUCTION 
Completing a construction project without incurring any disputes is an elusive goal for 
most project participants, since conflict has become an inherent characteristic of this 
industry (Peña-Mora et al. 2003). In response to financially expensive and emotionally 
draining litigation, many systems and procedures have been developed to address 
disputes within the construction industry (Gebken II and Gibson 2006). While a 
considerable amount of research has been conducted on various Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) techniques (Zack 1997, Rubin et al. 1999, Harmon 2003, Peña-Mora 
et al. 2003, Chan et al. 2006, Cheung et al. 2006, El-adaway and Kandil 2010), few 
studies have focused on how to reduce the negative impact of high ADR implementation 
costs associated with dispute resolution (Diekmann and Nelson 1985, Adrian 1988, 
Gebken II and Gibson 2006). In this study, implementation costs were not considered as 
the settlement amount of a dispute; rather, they refer specifically to the cost of 
implementing ADR techniques during the dispute resolution process, including fees and 
expenses paid to the owner’s/contractor’s employees, lawyers, claims consultants, third-
party neutrals, and other experts associated with the resolution process (Gebken II and 
Gibson 2006, Menassa et al. 2009). According to Gebken II and Gibson 2006, direct 
costs incurred during the dispute resolution process alone can equate to almost 2% of the 




injured business relationships or loss of productivity. From the perspective of risk 
management, one approach to mitigate this negative impact on the project budget, which 
is likely already financially stressed, is to price ADR implementation costs as an 
insurance product (Song et al. 2011). Insurance, as a risk financing tool, transfers the risk 
of unexpected high ADR implementation costs from project participants to the insurance 
company. In return, the insurance company receives a premium that covers the 
company’s underwriting expenses and targeted profit. 
The previous research by the writers proposed a basic framework for the ADR 
implementation insurance model, but two additional policies should be applied to prevent 
moral and morale hazards (Pritchett et al. 1996). In insurance analysis, the term “moral 
hazards” refers to a condition that “increases the likelihood that a person will 
intentionally cause or exaggerate a loss” (Myhr and Markham 2003). It often involves 
bad faith on the part of the insured. For example, faking the theft of a laptop in an effort 
to obtain a new one is a moral hazard. Morale hazards are “attitudes of carelessness and 
lack of concern that increase the chance of a loss occurring or increase the size of losses 
that do occur” (Pritchett et al. 1996). Reckless driving is a typical example of a morale 
hazard in auto insurance. Both moral and morale hazards describe different behaviors of 
the insured when protected from risk and when fully exposed to risk. The difference is 
that the former is considered malicious, while the latter is mainly due to indifference. 
Similarly, project participants who deliberately prolong a dispute resolution process are 
suspected of creating a moral hazard. On the other hand, a poor communication system 
that prevents efficient dispute resolution is an example of a morale hazard. To address the 




will include a Deductible Limit (DL) and a Maximum Payment Limit (MPL) on project 
participants. Figure 13 shows the insurance structure. Project participants will bear the 
first part of any ADR implementation costs that are incurred up to the DL as well as any 
costs that exceed the MPL. Together, these two limits  play an important role in 
determining the insurance premium. 
Figure 13: Structure of ADR Implementation Insurance 
This paper introduces an insurance model that incorporates uncertainties in 
potential ADR implementation costs and calculates the optimal premium for the insured 
based on the expected total loss and expected total subjective loss. Note that because of 
DL and MPL, project participants must be responsible for part of the future ADR 
implementation costs instead of completely relying on the insurance company to take the 
risk. As a result, their expected total loss and expected total subjective loss will increase 
and further affect the terms of the insurance policy. The intent of this study is to provide a 
mutually advantageous insurance policy for both the insured and the insurer, thus 
providing project participants with a certain degree of confidence against possible 
dispute-related cost overruns. 
 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Paid by Insured Cd2 Paid by Insurer Ct Paid by Insured Cd1 
Kick-in Point (DL) High Maximum (MPL) 
Deductible
s 
Major Insurance Benefit  
Cd = Cd1 +Cd2: Retained loss of project participants 





Before proceeding to the insurance model, the condition of a maximum acceptable 
premium is stated to help project participants understand and accept the merit of ADR 
implementation insurance in the light of financial loss implications. Assume that C is the 
total ADR implementation costs for a certain construction project. Insurance will cover 
the loss in the range between DL and MPL, as shown in Fig. 11 (Hoshiya et al. 2004). 
Thus, the total loss incurred can be expressed as: 
                                                                                                                   Eq. (4.1) 
where    is the retained loss of project participants, and    is the part that is transferred to 
the insurance company. From the perspective of project participants, the maximum 
acceptable Gross Premium (GP) is determined as follows (Hoshiya et al. 2004, Song et al. 
2011): 
                                         ( ( ))   ( (  ))   (  )                                   Eq. (4.2) 
                                                           (  )                                                  Eq. (4.3) 
Where: 
   ( )    Total Expected Subjective Loss  
   (  )    Expected Subjective Loss for project participants under insurance 
coverage 
 (  )    Expected Loss for the insurance company 
    Expense Loading Factor 
     Gross Premium as charged by the insurance company 
The left-hand side of Eq. (4.2) represents the situation in which the project does 
not carry ADR implementation insurance. As a result, project participants must bear all 




which project participants can choose to pay a certain amount of premium GP plus an 
uncertain amount of retained loss below the DL and above the MPL, as shown in Fig. 11, 
where   is the Expense Loading Factor included in GP to cover the insurance company’s 
underwriting expenses and targeted profit. In both cases, project participants view the 
undesirable financial outlay of possible uncertain loss subjectively with a subjective loss 
function (SLF) u, which quantifies project participants' risk-averse attitude towards a 
future risk in monetary terms (Song et al. 2011).   
According to Bowers et al. (1997) and Song et al. (2011), project participants with 
SLF  ( ) are risk averse if, and only if   ( )     . This means that the SLF for risk-
averse project participants is a strictly convex upward function. The relationship between 
GP and    ( )  is illustrated schematically in Figure 14. The left graph shows the 
situation in which insurance is attractive for project participants, while the right graph 
shows the opposite for much less risk-averse project participants.  
Figure 14: Schematic Illustration Of The Relationship Between GP And E[u(C)] 






















The flowchart developed by Song et al. (2011) serves as the first step in the model to 
determine whether an insurance policy formulated by the insurance company is beneficial 
for a specific project. The model proposed in this paper as shown in Figure 15 (Adapted 
from Hoshiya et al. 2004, Song et al. 2011) is an advanced version with Deductible Limit 
(DL) and Maximum Payment Limit (MPL) added to the policy. First, it assumes that 
disputes occur and go through the contractual Dispute Resolution Ladder (DRL), which 
is a predetermined procedure for dispute resolution that involves multiple ADR 
techniques (USACE 1989, Caltrans 2000, Peña-Mora et al. 2003). Disputes escalate from 
the lower stage to the higher stage if no satisfactory settlement is achieved within the 
maximum allowable time on each stage. Then, Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is applied to 
determine the Total Expected Loss  ( ) for a certain project and to determine the Total 
Expected Subjective Loss    ( )  for project participants, taking their Subjective Loss 
Function into consideration. If the simulation results indicate that a mutually acceptable 
insurance policy exists between project participants and the insurance company, then the 
Expected Subjective Loss    (  )  for project participants under insurance coverage and 
the Expected Loss  (  ) for the insurance company are calculated. Based on this, the 






















 Maximum Payment 
Limit (MPL)
 Deductible Limit (DL)
 Expense Loading 
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Expected Loss for 
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If unsatisfied, reset MPL, DL and α
Figure 15: ADR Insurance Model For Determining The Optimal Premium 
Again, Figure 7 from Chapter 2 shows the structure of the Event Tree Analysis 
(ETA). It first sets up the event of dispute occurrence as a specified condition. Then, the 
dispute goes through the contractual Dispute Resolution Ladder (DRL), which has m 
stages of ADR1, ADR2,…, and ADRm until final settlement. For the jth stage, assume 
that the effectiveness of ADRj is   , which is based on historical data and is used to 
determine the conditional probability of a certain dispute being resolved with ADRi. 
Furthermore, assume that the cost    for successfully resolving a dispute with ADRi has a 
normal distribution with mean    and standard deviation   , and is left truncated at 0 
(Touran 2003). The value of the parameters is based on the research results of Zucherman 
(2007b), which will be described later. Of course, project participants could use a 




greater accuracy. Finally, ETA generates probability-weighted scenarios for possible 
resolution outcomes of all disputes that occurred during the project. Note that each 
dispute resolution process is assumed to be independent. 
 The next step in the model is to determine the Total Expected Loss  ( ) and the 
Total Expected Subjective Loss    ( )  for project participants with a set of insurance 
policies. It is determined by Eq. (3.4) in Chapter 3. 
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE 
The standard dispute resolution process for government construction contracts in Hong 
Kong usually includes a three-step DRL (Peña-Mora et al. 2003). In this DRL, the design 
professional is responsible for the first determination concerning any disputes that arise. 
Then project participants have 28 days to refer the matter to mediation if no satisfactory 
settlement can be achieved. On the non-mandatory mediation level, 42 days are allowed 
to resolve disputes before they escalate to arbitration. Finally, the arbitrator has 28 days 
to issue a final binding determination for settlement, subject to the completion of the 
work. This paper presents a similar DRL as an example to demonstrate the proposed 
ADR insurance model. The effectiveness of each ADR can be determined by statistical 
data from the project participants' past experience. Assume that the cost of solving a 
dispute with a specific ADR has normal distribution truncated at zero. The mean value is 
determined from the average hourly or daily rate of mediators or arbitrators from the 
American Arbitration Association from different parts of the U.S. According to 
Zucherman (2007b), an arbitrator's compensation is estimated to be $2,200 at the per 
diem rate and the mediator's compensation to be $310 at the hourly rate. Based on these 




party construction dispute is $94,500, while the outlay for mediation is $10,140. Because 
ADR implementation costs are subject to wide variation based on the degree of 
complexity of the dispute, assume the coefficient of variation to be 0.5 for all three 
distributions. Again, this value should be based on the past experience of project 
participants. The stepwise approach is shown graphically in Figure 16. 
Figure 16: Project DRL And Distribution Of Resolution Costs Of Each ADR 
Assume for a highway bridge project that the estimated duration is      
months and that disputes occur according to a Poisson process with mean rate   
  (Touran 2003). The following SLF was used: 
                                             ( )            (      )                             Eq. (4.4) 
The function was calculated based on 96 samples taken from insurance 
purchasing owners in a financial survey (Hoshiya et al. 2004).  
In the simulation, the probability mass functions for project participants and the 
insurance company were evaluated with a DL of 5% and an MPL of $1 million. The 
Gross Premium was calculated with a 25% Expense Loading Factor. Figure 17 is based 














Figure 17: Different Scenarios Of Probability Mass Functions For Project Participants And 
Insurance Company 
Recalling Eq. (4.2), a gross premium GP is acceptable for project participants if, 
and only if:  
                                                  ( ( ))   ( (  ))                                             
                                                            (  )    
In this case,  
                                                 ( ( ))           
                                                    (  )                                                              
                                                 ( (  ))                       
which satisfies the condition described in Eq. (4.2). This means that project participants 
are willing to pay a gross premium of $0.91 MM to avoid the possibility of uncertain 
ADR implementation costs, which are distributed in a wide range of up to $1.8 million 




ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
While fixing   at 25%, the optimal premium was investigated by varying two parameters, 
DL and MPL, which impact both the insured and the insurer. According to Eq. (4.1), the 
optimal premium is achieved when the right-hand side of the equation reaches its lowest 
point. Figure 18 shows the impact of different MPL and DL values on Expected 
Subjective Loss, Expected Retained Subjective Loss, and the gross premium.  
 In Figure 18 (a), the MPL varies from 40% to 160% of the Expected Total Loss, 
while the DL and   are set at 5% and 25%, respectively. The minimum point of curve 
   (  )     is reached when the MPL is 130% of the Expected Total Loss. With the 
MPL at 130% and α at 25%, the DL varies from 0 to 14%. These results show that the 
optimal premium is obtained when the DL is 0. However, as mentioned before, an 
insurance policy should include the DL to avoid moral and morale hazards. Thus, despite 
the results, a 5% DL, which is commonly used in the insurance industry, was adopted in 
the model.  




Of course, the optimal combination of MPL and DL will differ with different 
subjective loss functions. An acceptable insurance policy depends largely on the project 
participants' degree of risk aversion. In addition to the exponential function used in the 
model, several elementary functions are commonly used to illustrate the properties of 
subjective loss functions, such as fraction power functions, quadratic functions, and 
logarithmic functions (Bowers et al. 1997).  
Figure 19(a) shows an example of risk-neutral project participants whose 
subjective loss function is  ( )   . In this case, because of the expense loading factor α, 
purchasing insurance will not be a favorable choice for project participants, which is 
obvious since    (  )     is always larger than    ( ) .  Figure 19 (b) presents the 
case of a quadratic subjective loss function  ( )         . It represents risk averse 
project participants, because it satisfies   ( )    and   ( )   . Figure 19 (b) suggests 
that, with 5% DL and 25%  , purchasing insurance is not feasible if the MPL is less than 
50%. The optimal point is reached at 110% MPL. For an insurance policy to be 
acceptable to project participants with 50% MPL and 5% DL, the Expense Loading 







Figure 19: Simulation With Different Subjective Loss Functions 
MODEL VALIDATION 
As discussed before, the ADR insurance model proceeds along the following analytical 
path. First, the key parameters describing the specific dispute and the contractual 
insurance policy are determined. The model then estimates the incidence of dispute 
resolution outcome from the dispute resolution process. Finally, the resulting cost for 




characteristics of the dispute and the policy terms. More specifically, a probabilistic ADR 
insurance model contains the following five basic steps: 
1. Assess the likelihood of dispute occurrence for a project. 
2. Estimate the dispute resolution outcomes, given the characteristics of the DRL 
and the disputes. 
3. Estimate the resolution costs, given the outcomes. 
4. Estimate the losses for both parties, given the resolution cost and the policy terms. 
5. Determine the feasibility of the insurance policy for the project. 
The ADR insurance model contains a comprehensive set of hypothetical events, 
each with an assigned probability. The event set is intended to provide a representative 
sampling of possible dispute resolution outcomes, the frequency and the severity. Thus, it 
produces an estimate of the range of possible losses for project participants and the 
insurance company, which further helps project participants determine whether a certain 
insurance policy is attractive or not. 
At each of the steps, local validation could be performed by “Testing Against 
Experience” method. Testing against experience is a common validation tool in the 
insurance industry (Sandstrom 2005). It compares the model’s predictions for a particular 
parameter to the available historical actual dataset (Collins and Lowe 2001, Sandstrom 
2005).  For example, the model’s probability of dispute occurrence frequency can be 
validated by comparison to projects completed by the same project participants with 
similar duration, contract value, and delivery methods, etc. Similarly, the dispute 
resolution outcome and associated average cost, which largely depends on the 




resolution process in a historical event. The dispute data used in the simulation of the 
illustrative example is adopted from a construction project that has several unsolved 
disputes. To further validate the model, future work will continue to focus on data 
collection and analysis. 
Because of estimation errors and uncaptured inter-relationships among variables, 
it is expected that the model results do not fully agree with actual observations. The 
following list presents some of the key contributors to ADR insurance model error: 
 Limited availability of key parameters for a sufficient number of 
construction disputes resolved by different ADR techniques.  
 Limited ability to simulate the actual dispute occurrence. 
 Limited ability to simulate all the possible dispute resolution outcomes 
because of the interdependence between disputes. 
 Limited knowledge of the precise cost for a dispute resolution process.  
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper investigates the role of ADR implementation insurance and proposed a 
methodology for determining the optimal premium. By establishing a mutually 
advantageous insurance policy and a rational premium that is acceptable to both project 
participants and the insurance company, ADR implementation insurance becomes a 
powerful risk management tool for construction projects. Through the study, the 
following conclusions were reached:  
1. Based on the framework of Song et al. (2011), a Deductible Limit (DL) and a 




prevent potential moral and morale hazards and thus encourage project 
participants to minimize the likelihood of dispute occurrence or to resolve 
disputes on the lower stage of the Dispute Resolution Ladder.  
2. From the project participants' prospective, future uncertain ADR implementation 
cost is measured using a Subjective Loss Function. An optimal premium is 
achieved when the right-hand side of Eq. (4.1) reaches its minimum. Simulation 
results suggest that the DL is normally a fixed value as adopted by the insurance 
industry. The MPL and the Expense Loading Factor α, which are proportional to 
the Expected Total Loss are two important variables in the optimization process. 
Depending on different risk attitudes of project participants, different values of 
MPL and α are required to make insurance acceptable. 
3. However, the study had several limitations. First, the Subjective Loss Function 
used in the simulation was taken directly from the research of Hoshiya et al. 
(2004) without further exploring the mechanism of establishing a user-oriented 
SLF. However, as mentioned in the paper, SLF should be obtained for each 
individual project in order to capture project participants' risk attitudes accurately. 
Second, independence between disputes was assumed to simplify the model. 
However, a real situation in which overlapping dispute resolution processes 
impact one another due to limited available resources could be more complicated. 
Thus, the correlation between disputes should be further investigated. Third, 
while feedback from the construction industry generally expressed interest and 
support for the design of ADR implementation insurance, future research will be 




experiment will be conducted with one project of our cooperating construction 
company to help validate the model. In addition to ADR implementation 
insurance, the industry is looking for a new product that covers not only ADR but 
also any legal expenses that are not covered by standard insurance. To meet such 
need, this research must be expanded to explore the possibility of developing a 








This dissertation investigates the application of insurance as a risk management tool for 
ADR implementation in construction disputes. The objective is to provide a mutually 
advantageous insurance policy for project participants and a third party. Three questions 
are addressed: 
 Why should ADR techniques be priced as an insurance product? 
 How should one structure ADR insurance policies? 
 How should one determine whether an insurance package is suitable for a 
certain project? 
To answer these questions, I compare the known cost of purchasing insurance for 
ADR implementation with the unknown cost of retaining the risk of uncertain disputes 
costs. In doing so, risk-averse project participants can transfer the risk of uncertainty of 
future disputes costs to a third party insurance provider. Chapters 2 to 4 built upon one 
another to provide evidence to answer these questions.  Chapter 2 drew analogies from 
health insurance to explore the role of insurance in the construction dispute resolution 
domain. Chapter 3 tool this concept a step further by considering the risk attitudes of 
project participants via utility theory. Chapter 4 completed the framework by adding two 
additional insurance limits to the model developed in the Chapter 3.  
The main contribution of this dissertation is the development of a framework that 
structures ADR techniques as an insurance product. This ADR implementation insurance 




third party. Because most projects in today's construction industry are financially 
stressed, the model presented in this dissertation provides project participants with an 
economic advantage by investing a premium in the beginning of the project in exchange 
for compensation from an insurance company in the uncertain event of unknown ADR 
costs that may be incurred during the construction phase. In all, the findings from this 
research expand current knowledge on construction dispute resolution from a risk 
management perspective.  
The development of an innovative insurance product in these three chapters has 
significant implications for the construction and insurance industries. For the former, 
such an insurance product provides a valid approach to transfer the risk of unexpected 
ADR costs. For the latter, offering such an insurance product could create a unique 
business opportunity to differentiate an insurance company from its competitors. This is 
especially important for the success of insurance companies in today’s competitive 
market. By revealing the key structure of ADR insurance, I intend that this dissertation 
contributes to bridge the gap between existing insurance packages and non-reimbursed 
expenses incurred during the dispute resolution process. 
In later section, I will discuss the theoretical and academic contributions of 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 
ADR INSURANCE FOR DIFFERENT PROJECT PARTICIPANTS 
Unlike many other businesses that only form two-party transactions, a construction 
dispute resolution process could involve numerous separate, yet interdependent parties, 
such as the owner, general contractor, subcontractors, suppliers, architect, engineer, and 




Gebken II and Gibson (2006), in a survey of 48 sample projects, there were 43 general 
contractors, 40 owners, 23 subcontractors, 16 architects, 7 bonding companies, and 2 
vendors involved in some disputes. As for dispute resolution costs, Gebken II and Gibson 
(2006) estimated that 30% were collected from the owners while 47% and 19% were 
collected from general contractors and subcontractors, respectively. Architects, engineers, 
and equipment vendors accounted for the remaining 4%.   
Recall from Chapter 1 that sometimes the dispute resolution costs could be as 
high as 2% of the entire contract value. Such costs could have catastrophic impacts on the 
parties involved. This is especially true for the owner, general contractor, and 
subcontractors, who contribute approximately 96% of the cost. Thus, for these parties, the 
idea of investing in ADR insurance and transferring the cost to the insurance company 
could be especially attractive.  
INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
The following sections discuss the contributions of each chapter in further detail. 
Chapter 2: Applying Insurance Pricing Theory for Pricing ADR as an Insurance 
Product 
In Chapter 2, I first introduce the well-developed theory of insurance pricing to the 
uncharted area of construction risk management. Specifically, I draw on an analogy from 
health insurance, which provides the patients with the benefit of reduced medical 
expenses in case of unexpected sickness. ADR implementation insurance resembles 
health insurance in high severity and high frequency. Recognizing the similarity, I further 




theory to price ADR techniques as an insurance product to address the risk of incurring 
exorbitant dispute resolution costs. I first develop a simple model to structure ADR 
implementation insurance using the pure premium method. This method provides project 
participants with an option to prearrange ADR implementation costs through a fixed-cost 
investment in an insurance-like product, rather than to set aside a certain percentage of 
contingency fees from the beginning of a project to deal with potential disputes. In doing 
so, project participants are relieved from the constant anxiety over uncertainty as 
unknown ADR implementation costs would be compensated by a third party. This, in 
turn, allows project participants to use funds more efficiently. 
Chapter 3: Insurance As A Risk Management Tool For ADR Implementation In 
Construction Disputes 
In Chapter 3, I adopt the concept of subjective loss to measure project participants’ 
attitudes toward risk. The most significant contribution of this chapter is that it provides a 
possible explanation for the validity of third-party insurance in construction management. 
A major challenge in developing ADR implementation insurance is that it is not attractive 
to project participants based on an expected value (EV) perspective. This is the case 
because insurance companies consider an expense-loading factor,  , to calculate the 
premium that covers the insurance company's underwriting expense and profit. To 
address this challenge, I follow the lead of Hoshiya et al. (2004) and adopt utility theory 
to infer the subjective value or utility of different choices in the face of uncertainty. A 
subjective loss is defined as the negative value attached by project participants to 
uncertain ADR implementation costs, which depends on participants’ attitudes toward 




of project participants and quantify the negative impact of ADR implementation costs in 
monetary terms. Subsequently, I mathematically prove that risk-averse project 
participants are willing to pay a fixed insurance premium that is higher than the mean 
expected value of ADR implementation costs in exchange for shedding future 
uncertainty. The results further show that, as long as the gross premium of ADR 
insurance is lower than project participants' subjective loss, there is a common ground for 
a mutually beneficial insurance policy between project participants and the insurance 
company, which could have significant implications for industry.    
Chapter 4: Determining the Optimal Premium For ADR Implementation Insurance In 
Construction Dispute Resolution 
In addition to the theoretical contribution of the previous two chapters, Chapter 4 presents 
a comprehensive framework that incorporates uncertainties in potential ADR 
implementation costs to answer two questions: (1) Is an insurance policy is beneficial for 
a certain project? and (2) if so, what is the optimal premium for project participants? The 
model first assumes that disputes occur and go through the contractual Dispute 
Resolution Ladder (DRL), which is a predetermined procedure for dispute resolution and 
involves multiple ADR techniques. Disputes escalate from the lower stage to higher stage 
if no satisfying settlement is achieved within the maximum allowable time at each stage. 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is then applied to simulate probability-weighted scenarios for 
possible dispute resolution outcomes and determine the probability mass function of 
ADR implementation costs by drawing an analogy from seismic risk insurance. 
Moreover, the insurance policy would have a Deductible Limit (DL) and Maximum 




this case, project participants would bear part of future ADR implementation costs before 
insurance is activated. The next step is to determine the total expected subjective loss for 
project participants, which considering their subjective loss function. If the simulation 
results indicate that a mutually acceptable insurance policy exists between project 
participants and the insurance company, then the expected subjective loss for project 
participants with insurance coverage and the expected loss for the insurance company are 
calculated. The model then determines the optimal point on a project participants’ 
subjective loss curve, which minimizes their total expected subjective loss. More 
importantly, throughout the development of the model, I was able to present my work to 
the industry, in particular, the Risk Management Group at Turner Construction Co. The 
valuable comments and feedback that I received allowed me to modify the underlying 
concepts and assumptions to make it more applicable to the industry. I believe continuing 






LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTED DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
The focus of this research is the potential application of ADR implementation insurance 
as an insurance product for project participants to manage the risk of incurring exorbitant 
costs when implementing ADR techniques. I approach this problem by comparing the 
subjective loss of uncertain resolution costs against the insurance premium charged by a 
third party. When subjective loss is high, such an insurance product is valid and project 
participants can successfully transfer risk to a third party. This unique topic has not yet 
been extensively studied in related literature. Thus, the model presented in this 
dissertation could serve as a foreshadowing of future events in construction risk 
management. Like any other models, however, this is not without its shortcomings. Here, 
I discuss three major limitations on modeling assumptions and industrial application. 
Limitation 1: Subjective Loss Function 
This dissertation adopts the concept of subjective loss to capture the risk attitudes of 
project participants and evaluate the negative impact of an ADR implementation cost on 
a project. As illustrated in Chapters 2 and 3, a Subjective Loss Function (SLF) is used to 
quantify a decision maker's risk-averse attitude toward future risk in monetary terms. 
Because of my limited access to project participants in real-world projects, the SLF used 
in the numerical examples were taken directly from the research results of Hoshiya et al. 
(2004). The reader should refer to Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the properties of 




a SLF should be obtained for each individual project capture project participants' risk 
attitudes accurately. Here, I briefly introduce how to use utility theory to construct a SLF 
for a specific construction project with a simple systematic approach presented by 
Bowers et al. (1997).  
 First, assign two utility values to two losses    and   . Without loss of generality, 
define      to represent the situation with no loss.  
 Second, ask the question: what is the maximum monetary value of   that project 
participants would be willing to pay for complete insurance protection against 
random loss of no loss (    ) with probability      and assuming    with 
probability  ? Expressing this in mathematical terms, the question for project 
participants to fix a value G such that: 
                      ( )     ( )  (   )   (  )     (  )               Eq. (6.1) 
Once the value      is available, add     (   )   (  )     (  )  as 
another point on the SLF.  
 Repeating above steps, project participants could add as many points as 
necessary. 
 Fit all points with a smooth function to obtain a SLF that characterizes  
participants risk aversion. 
Consider the following oversimplified example as an illustration. Assuming that, 
for a project, there are two points on project participants’ SLF, which are assigned 
utilities of 0 and 1, respectively,  ( )    and  (      )   . Suppose an ADR cost of 
$20,000 might be incurred with probability 0.5, or no ADR cost is incurred with 




event of incurring ADR costs    with probability   ). Project participants are then asked 
to determine the value   so that: 
                             ( )       (      )       ( )      
Here, if participants pay G, then their loss will certainly remain at G, instead of 
the uncertain $20,000. The equal sign indicates that project participants are indifferent in 
paying G with certainty and accepting the expected subjective loss. 
Assume that project participants decide that          . Then,  
                                              (      )      
From this, we can conclude that there is a possibility that participants would be 
willing to pay an insurance premium of          , which is greater than the expected 
loss of  ( )                          .  
This result is illustrated in Figure 20 with the dash line representing the subjective 
loss function and the solid line representing the expected value perspective. The 
approximated SLF consists of line segments with positive slopes. If we continue this 
process and obtain more points on the curve, we can generate a smooth curve that bears 






Figure 20: Building A User-Oriented SLF 
SLF provides a way to represent project participants’ qualitative preferences over 
alternatives of uncertain payoffs with a consistent quantitative comparison. Although the 
above procedure appears simple, building a SLF can be a rather complicated process 
because the process is a matter of subjective judgment that depends on many factors such 
as conflicting risk attitudes among project participants, project type, financial 
environment, etc. (Bowers et al. 1997). Even for the same project participants, different 
projects will have different subjective loss functions, thus subjective loss must be re-
evaluated for each project. In utility theory, utility function can be represented by several 
elementary functions such as exponential, fractional power, and quadratic functions, to 
name a few (Bowers et al. 1997). In this dissertation, exponential function is adopted as 
project participants’ SLF as explained in Chapter 3. For projects that require user-
oriented SLF, variables in the SLF could be estimated using regression. To elaborate, first 
a financial survey should be conducted for project participants to show their different 
perceptions of a given series of loss values. Then, with several points plotted on the SLF 

























project participants in comparison to previous established utility values) become the 
subjective loss function.  
Limitation 2: the assumption of independence among dispute resolution processes 
In this dissertation, I assume that dispute resolution processes are independent from each 
other. As a result, Poisson process, with its mathematical property of memorylessness 
(Willkomm et al. 2009) is adopted to simulate the occurrence of disputes. This means that 
the number of disputes that occur in any bounded interval after time   is independent 
from the number of arrivals that occur before time   (Cannizzaro 1978). Touran's (2003) 
research on a probabilistic model for cost contingency provides strong theoretical support 
for using Poisson process to simulate the number of disputes occurred in a given time 
interval. However, the real situation could be more complicated and the assumption of 
independence among disputes may be unrealistic. On one hand, overlapping dispute 
resolution processes could have a negative impact on one another because the project has 
limited resources available to allocate to different disputes. On the other hand, the 
occurrence of one dispute could be the prelusion of more disputes. Moreover, in real 
practice, project participants may utilize the “Total Cost” approach to handle disputes in a 
way that a number of heads of disputes are rolled up into one single dispute (MBB 2007). 
Although the “Total Cost” method is not favorable if another method is possible because 
of its inaccuracy (Irwin 2005), it does require modification to the assumption of 
independence among different dispute resolution processes if such method is adopted. In 
this case, when identifying scenarios of dispute resolution outcomes, the ETA, as shown 
in Figure 9 will generate multi-way splits instead of binary situations because more than 




choices to avoid too many possibilities for the next split in the tree based on the 
assumption of independence. However, for all the reasons discussed above, among 
others, the correlation between disputes should be further investigated.   
Limitation 3: the time value of money  
This dissertation presents the background material and the method for calculating the net 
single premium, which is the one-time charge required by the insurance company in order 
to carry risks specified in the insurance policy (Dorfman and Adelman 1992). After 
making the lump sum payment in full at the beginning of the contract term, the insured 
would expect the insurer to remain obligated to pay all benefits and deliver its future 
promises without incurring any extra costs. An alternative is to purchase ADR insurance 
in installments. For example, in the illustrative example in Chapter 3, the gross premium 
is a total of $9.95 million. Instead of paying one large amount at the inception of the 
contract, project participants may choose to purchase a series of periodically renewable 
term insurance contracts, also known as the level premium (Gerber 1997). This type of 
payment structure is common among commercial insurance lines such as auto insurance, 
life insurance and health insurance, as illustrated in Figure 5.  
For large-scaled infrastructure project, the ADR insurance contract could last for 
many years, and the time value of money become an important issue. In the dissertation, 
the illustrative examples involve a 2-year project, thus the time value of money is not 
considered for the convenience of the discussion; however, different premium payment 
structure will have a dynamic impact on the project's financial statements (Dorfman and 
Adelman 1992), and the time value of money could come into play in many ways. For 




be invested at a positive rate of interest until funds are needed to the next premium. As a 
result, future research should include the discounted time value of money of all future 
benefits in the calculation of the final sum of premium when long contractual periods are 
involved.  
Limitation 4: application of ADR insurance in industry 
This dissertation aims to provide a mutually advantageous insurance policy for project 
participants and third party insurance providers. While feedbacks from the construction 
industry generally suggests interest and support for the design of such an ADR 
implementation insurance, future research is necessary to determine how to apply it to 
real projects. In future work, an experiment will be conducted to study the projects of our 
cooperating construction company with the aim to validate the model developed in this 
research. In addition to ADR implementation insurance, the construction industry is 
looking for a new insurance product that covers ADR implementation as well as any legal 
expenses that are not covered by standard insurance. To meet such a need, this research 
must be extended to explore the possibility of developing a non-reimbursed expense 
insurance. 
Future Research  
In this dissertation, I draw upon utility theory and insurance pricing theory that have been 
well-developed in behavior economics and risk management science to address problems 
in the dispute resolution domain of a construction project. The results demonstrate that 
when project participants are risk-averse toward uncertain dispute costs, an ADR 




participants to a third party. A natural extension of this research is to explore the 
applicability of the results by examining the modeling assumptions limited above.  
This research is by no means the end, rather it provides a fundamental framework 
that can be extended to solve more similar problems in the construction industry. One 
possible application is the area of sustainable construction. In the next section, I will 
discuss the framework for developing Emission Liability insurance. 
With growing concern about global warming and climate change, the construction 
industry, as a major contributor to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, has begun to realize 
its essential role in improving the environment by reducing emissions through the life 
cycle of buildings and infrastructure. In the meanwhile, despite conflicting scientific 
evidence as to the severity of GHG emissions' impact on climate change, the insurance 
industry has more of an incentive than any other industry to catalyze upon global action 
to promote sustainability. In the long term, these strategies could help mitigate the risk of 
catastrophic natural hazards that would affect many insurance lines, including property 
and casualty, business interruption, health, and life. Although green insurance is a 
relatively new concept, first started in 2006 by Fireman’s Fund, insurance companies has 
provided a variety of products or services covering renewable energy, energy efficiency, 
and green buildings, either new or upgrades of existing buildings to a more resilient 
status following a loss. However, with government entities seeking to launch incentive-
based regulations and bidding standards for reducing carbon footprints, insuring against 
the risk of discrepancy between the actual and expected performance of GHG emissions 
during construction is another aspect that is often overlooked. Drawing an analogy from 




emissions liability insurance, an innovative insurance product designed to manage 
embodied carbon in the building process. The following sections initially elaborates on 
the role of insurance in sustainability risk management and follows this with an 
investigation on the Insurability of GHG Emissions Liability. Finally, a conceptual model 
is presented to illustrate how to utilize emissions liability insurance to guarantee the 
performance of GHG emissions during the construction phase.  
Introduction 
Burdened with a stressed budget and tight schedule, most development in the 
construction industry in the past was mainly guided by short-term economic 
considerations (Singh 2007). However, the imperative is a strong focus to deal with the 
pressing issues of sustainability at each stage of a building's life cycle. In response to 
other industries that strive to improve their environmental performance, the construction 
community has recently begun to realize its leadership role in promoting environmental 
stewardship. While a considerable amount of prior research has been devoted to assess 
the environmental impacts of sustainable design alternatives and post-construction 
operations (Vale and Vale 1996, Guggemos and Horvath 2006, Peschiera et al. 2010), 
there is an increased awareness of, and demand for, managing greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions during the building process. According to the EPA (2009a), the construction 
industry produced approximately 1.7% of the total U.S. GHG emissions in 2002, placing 
itself as the third highest GHG emitting sector. Although a single construction process 
does not produce as much GHGs as the operations of other industries, such as chemical 
or steel manufacturing, the sheer number of construction projects results in a significant 




seven industrial sectors, the construction industry is predicted to have the highest average 
annual rate of increase in GHG emissions from 2011 through 2030 (EPA 2009a). 
Although it is difficult to determine the extent of climate change driven by the 
GHG effect, there is little scientific debate on the fact that the global concentration of 
CO2 in the atmosphere has far exceeded its natural range (EIA 2004). As a result of 
global warming, the Earth is experiencing surface temperature increases, as well as 
changes in rainfall patterns, snow and ice cover, and sea levels (EPA 2009b). Extreme 
weather events, such as floods, droughts, heat waves and wildfire, also show a consistent 
trend of an increase in frequency and intensity from 1950 to 2000 (IPCC 2007).  In 2005, 
catastrophic losses to the economy were $62 billion, up from an average of $4 billion a 
year in the 1950s and $40 billion in the 1990s (ISO 2007). Moreover, climate change 
could also impose profound threats to human health (Epstein 2000). The WHO estimates 
annual deaths of 150,000 from climate change as of 2000 (McMichael et al. 2003). 
According to Epstein (2000), global warming will expand the incidence and distribution 
of many serious medical disorders. Undoubtedly, global warming and climate change has 
presented itself as one of the most significant risks that could lead to serious social and 
economic consequences.  
As the second largest industry in the world in terms of assets, the insurance 
industry has long been in the vanguard of understanding and managing risks and has 
more of an incentive than any other industry to catalyze upon global action to promote 
sustainability and address the environmental challenge of climate change (UNEP 2009). 
Although green insurance is a relatively new concept, first started in 2006 by a U.S. 




innovative products or services covering renewable energy, energy efficiency, green 
buildings, either new or upgrades of existing buildings to a more resilient status following 
a loss (Bushnell 2010). However, with government entities seeking to launch incentive-
based regulations and bidding standards for reducing carbon footprints, insuring against 
the risk of discrepancy between the actual and expected performance of GHG emissions 
during construction is another aspect that is often overlooked. This research will focus on 
the application of emissions liability insurance in managing embodied carbon in the 
building process. Drawing an analogy from the mechanism of the construction 
professional liability insurance, this innovative insurance product will serve as a financial 
tool to support the government's effort in promoting sustainability by guaranteeing that 
the contractor will perform in accordance with the terms and conditions of an underlying 
agreement of a carbon footprint limit during the construction phase.  
Problem Statement 
The key problem with current practices in managing GHG emissions in the construction 
phase is that existing government regulations and standards for construction emissions 
are limited to hazardous air pollutants (HAPs), such as CO, NOx, PM, volatile organic 
compound (VOC) and SO2, with no focus on GHGs (Peña–Mora et al. 2009), despite the 
fact that GHGs are also defined as a pollutant under the Clean Air Act, ruled by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 2008 (EPA 2008). As a result, although the government is providing 
incentives for carbon reduction, there are no enforcement mechanisms to guarantee the 
performance of GHG emissions if the contractors consider the reduction measurements to 
be economically unattractive. On the other hand, even if contractors strive to follow the 




from inefficient construction methods, field rework, improperly sized equipment, among 
others. To deal with this unwanted situation, there is a broad agreement that the key 
policy is to put a price on GHG emissions (CBO 2008). One example is the popular cap-
and-trade policy in Europe and Asia, where each firm in the system is assigned an overall 
quota, or cap, on the total amount of CO2 they are allowed to emit. Firms that "over-
emit" must purchase an extra quota from those organizations that emit less than their 
allowance, so as to keep the total amount of emissions in the system to a certain limit 
(Tietenberg 2003). However, despite the vigorous debate of introducing the cap-and-trade 
program into the US, there is currently no system in existence. Hence, there is a need to 
explore other possible methods on managing GHG emissions during the construction 
phase. 
In this research, one approach is proposed which adds another dimension to the 
traditional project management structure and investigates the possibility of applying 
insurance theories into construction GHG emissions. As illustrated in Figure 21, 
contractors will suffer economic consequences if they fail to follow the planned schedule, 
budget and quality described in the contract. For example, the owner requires a 
performance bond from the contractor as protection from financial loss should the 
contractor fail to fulfill the contract (Dagostino and Feigenbaum 1999); a liquidated 
damage clause would protect the owners from construction delays by charging the 
contractor a certain sum of money for every day he/she goes over the scheduled 
completion date (Eggleston 2009). Analogously, required emissions liability insurance 
will compensate the owner in the event of the contractor failing to meet the emissions 





 Figure 21: Project Management Structure With GHG Emissions 
The Role Of Insurance In Sustainability Risk Management 
The previously mentioned issues with current construction GHG emissions management 
also indicates vast opportunities for insurers to be part of the global warming solution. In 
risk management, insurance products have served as both risk control and risk financing 
techniques. The first function is designed to eliminate or reduce the likelihood or amount 
of a loss (Myhr and Markman 2003). For example, as part of most health insurance plans, 
routine visits to a doctor’s office or periodic physicals provide ways to reduce the 
likelihood of getting sick. Similarly, having emissions liability insurance on a project 
would encourage contractors to closely monitor their emissions status and implement an 
adjustment in a timely fashion; secondly, as a risk financing technique, an insurance 

















Again, taking health insurance as an example, the insurance company will compensate 
customers for their medical expenses, wholly or partially, in return for the payment of a 
specified premium. In construction GHG emissions, especially for public projects, by 
requiring emissions liability insurance from the awarding contractor, the owner would 
expect compensation from the insurance company for the negative environmental impact 
of over-emissions, should the contractor fail to meet the pre-determined emissions goal. 
In addition, analogous to auto insurance, in which the insurance company charges a 
higher premium to drivers with a higher likelihood of incurring accidents or reject to 
insure drivers with bad records, the emissions liability insurance could serve as a 
selection tool in the bidding process that screens out contractors with undesired 
environmental performance by a high emissions liability premium. 
In addition to providing financial protection for owners in managing GHG 
emissions and helping to promote sustainability in the construction process, developing 
an innovative insurance product for GHG emissions could also be a good business 
opportunity for the insurance industry. Prior research studies have provided a number of 
approaches for reducing GHG emissions during the construction process, both from the 
owner's and contractor's perspectives. For example, the contractors are able to control 
activities, such as fuel selection, equipment selection, equipment idling time, and 
materials recycling, while the owner has an influence over site selection and materials 
selection. Table 9 is a summary of the measurements suggested by EPA (2009a).  








Fuel Selection  • 




Equipment Maintenance  • 
Driver Training  • 
Properly Sized Equipment  • 
Replaced or Repowered Equipment  • 
Bio fuels for Trucks and Non-road Equipment  • 
Alternatives to Diesel Generators  • 
Employee Commuting •  
Conserving 
Electricity 
Reducing Field Electricity Use  • 





Recycling and Reuse  • 
Materials Selection, Procurement, and Shipment 
Methods 
•  
These measures would effectively reduce loss exposures, which are similar to the 
more familiar risk management technologies that encouraged insurance company's 
involvement, such as automobile seatbelts or airbags, smoke alarms, or preventive 
medicine (Mills 2003).  
In addition, the increasingly competitive market motivates insurance and risk-
management companies to push for product and service innovations that differentiate 
them from fellow competitors and offer new ways to meet customers' demands (Mills 
2003). For example, Fireman’s Fund's GreenGuard Program replaces standard materials 
and systems with green alternatives after a loss. AIG’s Sustain-A-Build Program enables 
AIG environmental customers to receive discounts of up to 10% on premiums for new 
pollution legal liability policies. These two programs are both pilot insurance programs 
entering the fledgling construction sustainability risk management market (Ayers 2008). 
Emissions Liability Insurance 
Not all risks are insurable by private insurers (Pritchett et al. 1996). A risk that is 




number of similar exposure units; 2. The claims must be derived from a fortuitous loss 
outside the control of the principal; 3. The losses should be definite; 4. It must have a 
determinable probability distribution; 5. It must be catastrophe unlikely; and lastly, 6. It 
must be economically feasible (Pritchett et al. 1996). Table 10 elaborates upon the 
insurability of GHG emissions liability in construction projects. 
Table 10: Insurability Of GHG Emissions Liability 
Requisite Characteristics For 
Insurability 
GHG Emissions Liability 
Large number of similar 
exposure units 
More than 800,000 construction firms and the even larger 
number of construction sites form a massive emissions 
liability risk pool (EPA 2009). 
Accidental loss 
The performance of GHG emissions is subject to many 
factors, such as work efficiency, equipment condition among 
others. Because of the uniqueness of each project, the risk of 
over-emissions involves only the possibility, not the 
certainty. 
Definite loss 
Require detailed contract provisions regarding recordkeeping 
for GHG emissions for future reference of cause and 
severity. 
Calculable loss 
The loss could be evaluated by the price per unit of GHG 
emissions (generally one ton) as in the emissions cap and 
trade market. 
Limited risk of 
catastrophically large losses 
Catastrophic refers to an event that would affect many 
insured at the same time, such as hurricanes or earthquakes, 
which is hardly the case with GHG emissions.  
Affordable premiums 
The ratemaking process of determining the premium should 




Figure 22 shows the mechanism of the emissions liability insurance. First, the 
owner sends out an RFP with an estimated limit of GHG emissions for a certain project. 
Contractors then submit proposals with quotes of their emissions liability insurance, 
determined by the insurance company’s underwriting process, and denotes for what 
amount of insurance, at what price, and under what conditions. The premium of the GHG 
emissions liability is part of the cost estimates, similar to the performance bond. The 
owner evaluates the bids accordingly and monitors the awarding contractor’s emissions 
performance after he/she enters the construction phase. At the end of the project, if the 
contractor emits less GHG than the setting limit, the insurance company may offer future 
premium discounts for his/her emissions liability insurance. In contrast, the insurance 
company could charge a higher premium if the contractor “over-emits”, making him/her 
less favorable in  future competitions.  
 
Figure 22: GHG Emissions Liability Insurance Model 
Conclusions 
Just as the insurance industry once asserted its leadership and expertise in tackling 




financial tool during the building process stands as an immense opportunity for 
promoting sustainability in construction projects. This paper introduces the concept of 
developing an innovative insurance product – emissions liability insurance. From the 
owner’s perspective, the objective is to encourage construction contractors to improve 
their environmental performance in public projects through a financial means. Although 
the model presented in the paper is still in the conceptual development phase, it appears 
that there are both risk management and risk financing benefits potentially available to 
owners if such a process can be devised.  
While this paper has provided a framework for emissions liability insurance, the 
details of how to use it directly in a construction project still need to be developed. 
Furthermore, the authors will look into other possible applications of insurance, such as 
cap and trade, general contractor's pollution liability, and so on, under the framework of 
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APPENDIX A: Dispute Distribution Simulation In Chapter 2 
 
function [ ] = Dispute(  ) 
%first journal paper 
 
for i = 1:100 
T = 24; 
lambda = 3; 
U1 = rand();  
t = -(1/lambda)*log(U1); 
stop = 0; 
C = []; 
S = []; 
p1 = 0.5; 
p2 = 0.25; 
p3 = 0.175; 
p4 = 0.075; 
c1 = 0.015; 
c2 = 0.0525; 
c3 = 0.165; 
c4 = 0.805; 
  
while stop==0 
U2 = rand(); 
if U2<=p1 
    c = c1; 
    s = c1+1880*(exp(0.007*c1)-1); 
elseif U2>p1 && U2<= p1+p2 
    c = c2; 
    s = c2+1880*(exp(0.007*c2)-1);  
elseif U2>p1+p2 && U2<=p1+p2+p3 
    c = c3; 
    s = c3+1880*(exp(0.007*c3)-1); 
else 
    c = c4; 
    s = c4+1880*(exp(0.007*c4)-1); 
     
end 
C = [C;c]; 
S = [S;s]; 
U1 = rand(); 
t = t -(1/lambda)*log(U1); 
if t > T 





Totalloss(i) = sum (C); 
Totalsub(i) = sum (S); 
GP(i)= Totalloss(i) * 1.25; 
end 
TL = mean(Totalloss) 
TS = mean(Totalsub) 







function Tt = nhPoisson(t) 
  
% This program generates the next arrival of a non homogeneous Poisson 
% process that occurs after time t.  
  
Stop = 0; % Indicates whether we successfully generated the next 
arrival or not 
[lambda,lambdat] = getRate(t); % Obtain the value of lambda 
while Stop == 0 
    U1 = rand; 
    t = t - log(U1)/lambda; 
    [lambda, lambdat] = getRate(t); % Obtain the intensity function 
lambda(t) 
    U2 = rand; 
    if U2 <= lambdat/lambda 
        Tt = t; 
        Stop = 1; 
    end 
end 
end 




APPENDIX B: Dispute Distribution Simulation In Chapter 3 
 
function [ ] = ADRInsurance(  ) 
%second journal paper 
  
for i = 1:100 
L = 24; 
lambda = 2; 
U1 = rand();  
t = -(1/lambda)*log(U1); 
stop = 0; 
C = []; 
S = []; 
T = []; 
T = [T;t]; 
p1 = 0.5; 
p2 = 0.25; 
p3 = 0.25; 
  
  
mu1 = 0.015; 
sigma1 = (0.5 * mu1)^.5; 
mu2 = 0.015; 
sigma2 = (0.5 * mu2)^.5; 
mu3 = 0.045; 




U2 = rand(); 
if U2<=p1 
    temp =  normrnd(mu1,sigma1);           %truncated normal 
    I = 0;  
    while I == 0 
        if temp >= 0 && temp <= 0.03 
            I = 1;  
        else 
            temp = normrnd(mu1,sigma1); 
            I = 0; 
        end 
    end 
    c = temp; 
    s = c+1880*(exp(0.007*c)-1); 
     
elseif U2>p1 && U2<= p1+p2 
     
    temp =  normrnd(mu2,sigma2);           %truncated normal 
    I = 0;  
    while I == 0 
        if temp >= 0 && temp <= 0.03 
            I = 1;  
        else 
            temp =  normrnd(mu2,sigma2); 




        end 
    end 
    c = 0.03 + temp; 
    s = c+1880*(exp(0.007*c)-1); 
else 
    temp = normrnd(mu3,sigma3);           %truncated normal 
    I = 0;  
    while I == 0 
        if temp >= 0 && temp <= 0.09 
            I = 1;  
        else 
            temp = normrnd(mu3,sigma3); 
            I = 0; 
        end 
    end 
    c = 0.06 + temp; 
    s = c+1880*(exp(0.007*c)-1); 
     
end 
C = [C;c]; 
S = [S;s]; 
U1 = rand(); 
t = t -(1/lambda)*log(U1); 
T = [T;t]; 
if t > L 





Totalloss(i) = sum (C); 
Totalsub(i) = sum (S); 
GP(i)= Totalloss(i) * 1.25; 
  
Insured_nosub(i) = 0.05*Totalloss(i) + max(0,(Totalloss(i)-3)); 
sub = (Totalloss(i)-3)+1880*(exp(0.007*(Totalloss(i)-3))-1); 
Insured_sub(i) = 0.05*Totalsub(i) + max (0,sub); 
if Totalloss(i)>3 
    In_Comp(i) = 3*0.95; 
else 





TL = mean(Totalloss) 
TS = mean(Totalsub) 
TGP = mean(GP); 
TINS = mean(Insured_nosub) 
TIS = mean(Insured_sub) 
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